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AFIT/GEM/ENV/12-M10 
Abstract 
Firm Fixed Price and Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract types have been utilized the 
most for construction in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters.  Often construction occurs in 
contested regions that are known to be particularly challenging, unpredictable, and 
unstable.  The object of this study was to analyze the performance of these two contract 
types in this contingency environment, and to determine what internal and external 
influencing factors seemed to impact contract success the most. 
The methodology first evaluated existing construction performance data using 
bivariate and analysis of variance to indentify differences contract type.  Next, a 
quantitative/qualitative questionnaire was conducted to gather expert opinions on the 
factors that were perceived to have the most impact on contingency contract 
performance.  The combined synthesis of information sources was used to determine 
what key performance/risk measures impacted success of each contract type the most, 
and what measures may be beneficial for evaluating contingency construction contract 
success in the future.  
The findings of this study indicated there was no proven advantage in cost 
performance for either contract type.  FFP projects showed to control schedule growth 
significantly better than CPFF.   CPFF contracts indicated a better quality product.  
Additional results of this study identified that understanding project performance in a 
contingency environment involved a balance of numerous variables that may impact 
projects in unique ways based on the chosen contract type.   
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FIRM FIXED PRICE AND COST PLUS FIXED FEE CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Problem Statement 
Introduction 
 Construction contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq have been continually plagued with 
execution problems and poor outcomes (Thibault and others 2009, Thibault and others 
2011, Roemhildt 2010, SIGAR 2011, GAO 2011).  The operating areas in Afghanistan 
and Iraq are known to be unpredictable and unstable.  Often construction occurs in 
contested regions.  Contractors can face the threat of hostilities such as kidnappings, 
death threats, political pressure, poor supply lines, and unskilled or unreliable labor.  It 
can be difficult adequately quantify the impact of a single influencing factor when so 
many forces are bearing down on a construction project that is lagging behind or is 
suffering from poor workmanship. 
In Afghanistan and Iraq construction efforts are complex and problematic.  
Construction agencies and contractors find it difficult to mitigate risks in an environment 
with an unskilled labor force, poor supplies, logistical challenges, and security threats 
thwarting their great efforts to complete projects.  In a place with ongoing war and force 
requirements greater than logistics can supply, turning a project from inception to 
occupancy is a challenge (Dorko 2011, SIGAR 2011, Thibault and others 2011).  
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Finding the right contract-type to effectively balance the risk for the government 
and the contractor in such an unpredictable environment is important (DCMA 2010).  An 
imbalance of risk can influence the long-term viability of the completed construction 
project, and a good balance can provide the mutual benefits of establishing sustainable 
personnel and contract relationships (S. G. Arditi 2005).  The attainment of feedback on 
the benefits and risks experienced by both the government and contractors in the 
execution of different contract types in addition to existing project performance data may 
assist decision-making in the selection of contract types in future work.   
Background 
Since the start of the war in 2001, the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) has been executing construction projects in the active war zones of 
Afghanistan and later, Iraq (Dorko 2011).  Since 2004 the Air Force Center for 
Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) has executed similar construction projects 
(Cassidy 2011).   
USACE and AFCEE are responsible for the majority of multi-million dollar host-
nation reconstruction task orders in Afghanistan and Iraq.  These two agents have both 
executed primarily Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) or Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract types, 
but little has been published evaluating the specific outcomes of construction projects in a 
combat zone with respect to contract type (Manuel 2010; Thibault and others 2011).  This 
thesis evaluated available data to determine if contract type impacts construction 
performance, and/or if other factors play a significant role in project success.         
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Recurring problems seem to continue to plague construction projects in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  In a January 2011 The Federal Commission Hearing on Wartime Contracting 
identified issues and the need to improve:  
“host-nation involvement in project selection, cost, schedule and quality of the 
construction projects in Afghanistan, sustainability of the US funded construction 
projects in Afghanistan, the past performance record of construction companies 
employed, and quality assurance problems…and finally the adequacy of 
contractor business systems used to monitor progress of major construction 
projects” (Thibault and others 2011).   
Since so many issues exist in a contingency environment it can be difficult to sift 
through all the problems to determine which variable(s) can be isolated and influenced by 
government construction agencies to stabilize and improve performance and which 
variables may have the greatest positive impact.  USACE and AFCEE generally leverage 
different contract types, organizational structures, requirements generation techniques, 
security and logistics risk postures, and construction oversight methodologies (SIGAR 
2011).  So, it may be beneficial to focus on only one organization to come to a clearer 
conclusion on which factors are having the most impact on construction success.  
To evaluate the performance of CPFF and FFP contract types one must determine 
the influential indicators of performance and success, and evaluate contracts with 
standardized criterion.  Several researchers have studied the impact of key performance 
indicators on measuring project success (A. A. Chan 2004, A. P. Chan 2002, A. A. Chan 
2004, A. P. Chan 2004, S. G. Arditi 2005, Akintoye 1997).  This research gathered expert 
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opinions on the most influential performance indicators for success in literature, those 
used in practice by our agencies, and quantitative and qualitative performance data,  
This research gathers and analyzes expert feedback, quantitative performance 
data, organizational practices, and study the challenges of combat theater.  The outcome 
of this study may help determine which performance measures may be the most 
advantageous for USACE and AFCEE to consider in as part of their existing project 
performance tracking.  
Problem Statement 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the current operations of AFCEE and 
USACE, but focus primarily on construction outcomes against a set of performance 
criteria to provide more realistic contract feedback to program and project managers.  The 
hope was to produce reliable comparisons and conclusions on the performance successes 
and failures of FFP and CPFF contracts in an active war zone.  Also, the goal was to 
compile a set of influential contingency performance measures that could be used as a 
tool to evaluate or consider when choosing the most advantageous contract types for 
future projects.   
Research Questions 
The following questions outline the intent of this research: 
1. How does an agency choose CPFF versus FFP? 
2. What risks are associated with CPFF and FFP contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan? 
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3. What measures of performance are used for Iraq and Afghanistan and should 
others be considered for use? 
4. Does one contract type produce a better product based on available data and/or 
determined measures of performance?  
5. How do those results compare to another market, such as the United States?  
Methodology 
The methodology employed in this research is two-fold. The first goal was to 
measure project performance based on existing construction data, and to determine the 
possible influences of that performance on overall contract-type success.  The second 
goal was to determine what key performance/risk indicators may be beneficial for 
evaluating project success in the future.  
The first step was to take existing performance data and perform statistical 
analysis.  Available construction data from AFCEE construction projects in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and the United States was included to compare and contrast existing performance in 
multiple environments.  Two statistical analysis tools were used to find trends, 
correlations, and significant differences in the available contract performance data.  The 
expectation was to identify key performance indicators for the environment, their impact 
on overall project success. 
The second goal was to establish key performance indicators (KPIs) that could be 
used to measure project success.  An extensive literature review of performance criteria 
was executed to discover which performance measures are used to define a successful 
project in the federal government and also in the civilian sector.  Next, expert opinions 
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from construction personnel with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq were gathered to 
determine the most appropriate measures for use in the region.  The results of the analysis 
will be discussed in the final chapters.      
Assumptions and Limitations 
Several assumptions were made in the methodology employed.  The first, that all 
data on construction projects in AFCEE would be available to review and the data entries 
would be error-free.  The second assumption was that statistical performance evaluations 
would have the power required to indicate some trends between the criteria of project 
success.  Finally, it was assumed that the survey process would receive a high feedback 
rate from most project participant positions involved in contingency construction.   
Limitations of this research may be difficultly transferring project data and 
performance measures from AFCEE, and also in gathering accurate project data and 
representative samples of the population in the survey.  The risk of pulling inaccurate 
data entries from active databases or a limited number of available projects for each 
contract type could skew the statistical significance of results and therefore produce 
fewer reliable conclusions.  Lack of participation in the interview process could make the 
results of expert feedback less valuable for organizations that may wish to employ their 
suggestions.      
Significance of Study 
The outcome of this research will be a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
CPFF and FFP contract types in an active combat zone, and a suggested set of military 
contingency specific performance measures.  The resulting analysis outputs and expert 
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feedback on contingency contract performance may positively influence the way the 
government performs construction contracts in current operations and future conflicts.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
 
Background 
The United States Government most often awards two different types of 
contracts: fixed price and cost reimbursement (Manuel 2010). Each type has its own 
advantages and risks (DCMA 2010).  The Contracting Officer bears the responsibility to 
determine which type is most appropriate based on a number of factors.  Prior to 
solicitation, future work is evaluated against a number of criteria to include: complexity, 
competition, requirement definition, project length and historical data of similar work 
(Manuel 2010).  The decision to choose cost plus or fixed type contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has largely been split (J. A. Christoff 2005, Walker 2007).  The purpose of 
this literature study is to better understand the two contract types, their historical use in 
the government and private sector, what tools are used to indicate project success, and to 
distill recent audits and guidance released by federal agencies with respect to these two 
contract types in order to develop the background for contingency contracting analysis. 
Firm Fixed and Cost Plus Fixed Fee Type Contracts 
A fixed price type contract is the most commonly used contract for federal 
procurement.  It is the default method for all contracting actions; utilized when conditions 
are fairly certain and risk is minimal (GSA 2010). The maximum amount of 
responsibility is placed on the contractor to perform within the agreed price and time 
constraints with the minimum amount of oversight and project control required for the 
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government.  (Mayo 2010, DCMA 2010).  The imperative for a successful firm fixed 
price contract is a well developed requirement and reasonable estimates can be made for 
the project’s execution (GSA 2010). 
A cost type contract is most commonly used in federal procurement when 
uncertainty in scope, duration, and performance are such that it is not reasonable to use a 
fixed price contract.  The award amount and payments are made to reimburse the 
contractor as costs are incurred.  Like fixed price contracts, cost contracts have a price 
ceiling that cannot be exceeded without permission of the contracting officer.  An 
important aspect of a cost contract is the necessity of more rigorous government 
oversight (GAO 2011).  The contractor must also provide well-documented cost 
information during project progress (GSA 2010). 
A cost plus fixed fee contract is different from the basic cost type contract, in that 
the contractor is allotted a pre-negotiated fee for his work.  This fee is not dependent on 
the actual contract amount; the contractor is given a small incentive to complete the 
project on time and within budget.  This contract type is designed to, “permit contracting 
efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to the contractors” (GSA 2010).  This 
type of contract puts the government at a higher risk, so although there is increased 
flexibility to make changes, the project must be monitored more carefully by the project 
manager (Mayo 2010, GAO 2011). 
Identifying Construction Risk 
 Construction contracting in international, contingency environments is considered 
a high-risk business.  Similar projects often have entirely different risk characteristics in 
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different regions.  Accurately identifying and controlling risk factors for each new project 
is crucial for survival.   
 Construction project risk falls into two basic categories: environmental or external 
and project or internal risk.  Internal risk internationally is often similar to domestic 
projects and generally easier to avoid, although the extremity of internal issues is 
sometimes heightened in a contingency.  External project risk is the most difficult to 
understand and mitigate.  Agents and contractors need to consider external risk from 
many angles: the national, regional, and political lens (Zhi 1995).  In Afghanistan and 
Iraq, external risks initially brought about a steep learning curve for all parties involved 
(J. A. Christoff 2005, Christoff and others 2006, Hutton 2006, Walker 2007). 
 In Afghanistan and Iraq a number of lessons learned were highlighted and 
documented through Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports from 2003 
through 2011, and also audits and hearings from Congressional Committees from 2008 
through 2011.  Problems in Afghanistan include: bribery, contract fraud, faulty 
construction, unreliable materials, poor site selection, and inability to provide adequate 
oversight (Thibault and others 2011).  In Iraq, attacks on coalition, Iraqi’s and contractors 
developing infrastructure reached such high levels in 2006 that costs for increased 
security and support were estimated to rise to almost 33 percent of total estimated 
construction costs (Christoff and others 2006).  
 Effective risk identification and management has become increasingly important 
for success.  Projects have become increasingly complex and foreign environments 
remain unstable and difficult navigate without adequate understanding of the risks.  
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Although construction risk is most often determined based on experience, assumptions 
and rules of thumb by contractors and owners, this intuitive approach is not necessarily 
the best way to identify and manage risks in Afghanistan and Iraq (Baloi and Price 2002). 
Iraq and Afghanistan Construction Background 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Air Force Center 
for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) are the two primary organizations tasked 
to accomplish large-scale construction work for government and infrastructure rebuilding 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Each organization works to support the mission of the in-
country customer.  In Iraq the customer was the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq (MNC-I), 
and in Afghanistan it is U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the Combined Security 
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A).  The customer develops the basic 
requirement and then tasks one of the construction agents with execution.  The process of 
further project development, award, and construction then follows the specific structures 
of the construction agent’s organization (Mayo 2010).   
AFCEE Construction Agency 
AFCEE is a field-operating agency for the Air Force Civil Engineer.  It provides 
environmental and engineering services for Air Force installations.  In 2003 the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Air Force Chief of Staff asked AFCEE 
to provide assistance with construction efforts in Central Command (CENTCOM).  By 
2004, the organization started its supporting operation in Iraq.  In 2006, AFCEE began 
providing construction capacity in Afghanistan.  
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AFCEE utilizes its own Heavy Engineer, Repair and Construction (HERC), and 
Worldwide Planning, Program and Design (4PAE) contracts to accomplish the majority 
of their construction requirements.  The HERC and 4PAE contracts are Indefinite Deli, 
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicles.  These allow AFCEE to hire expatriates 
prime contractor construction, design, and quality assurance personnel for all of their 
projects.  AFCEE encourages primes to utilize third country national and local national 
subcontractors to execute task orders. This approach provides AFCEE projects with a 
minimum of US civilian, military, and contractor footprint and a large force of local 
workers and laborers.  This model allows greater overall flexibility, accessibility by 
quality assurance personnel, and cost-effectiveness (Cassidy 2011). 
The Contingency Construction Division (AFCEE/CX) office in San Antonio, 
Texas is consists of a relatively small staff and serves as the hub for all of their 
construction and contract efforts in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of 
Operations (AOR). Over the past eight years, AFCEE has awarded six billion dollars 
worth of contracts in CENTCOM to support the contingency mission.  This team 
provides reach back support for the majority of contracting, financial, and administrative 
duties in theater (Cassidy 2011).     
USACE Construction Agency 
The US Army Corps of Engineers is a worldwide engineering and contracting 
agency for the US government.  USACE has had an ever-increasing presence in the 
CENTCOM AOR since the start of the start of contingency operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  To fulfill the agency’s growing requirements, the Transatlantic Division (TAD) 
headquartered in Winchester, Virginia was reactivated in September of 2009 as the ninth 
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major subordinate command under USACE.  The TAD is responsible for engineering 
services in the CENTCOM AOR.  The offices in Virginia provide reach back support to 
the district offices in theater to reduce their footprint.  The TAD contains three district 
headquarters for contingency and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
Gulf Region District is in Baghdad, and there is one Afghanistan Engineer District North 
in Kabul and one South in Kandahar (TAD 2011).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - USACE Structure  (TAD 2011) 
 
 
 
The districts in Afghanistan are currently increasing their presence and mission 
while the Gulf Region District is drawing down.  The AED North and South currently 
have approximately 500 Corps personnel in Afghanistan and the numbers are growing.  
The district in Iraq has drawn down to 350 members and is steadily declining from its 
peak of 1000 personnel as projects wrap-up (TAD 2011).       
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The USACE mission is different from AFCEE in that their mission is much 
broader and their human and technical support resources are much greater.  For example: 
the districts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide in theater contracting and engineering 
support, allowing more timely and expert feedback to project managers in the field, 
whereas AFCEE relies on contracting support from their field operating agency based in 
San Antonio and engineering support is a contracted service (Roemhildt 2010). 
Key Performance Indicators - Government 
Tracking project performance is important to ensure overall project success.  Both 
USACE and AFCEE use Construction Contractor Appraisal Support System (CCASS) 
ratings to document contractor performance upon project completion.  The rating system 
is a five-tier scale ranging from Unsatisfactory to Outstanding performance and is 
prepared by the government’s QA representative, the resident engineer (COR/PM) and 
area engineer (PM or CO).  This rating remains on the record of the contractor for several 
years and can impact future work not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also throughout 
the world when they choose to bid on construction projects (AED-N 2010).  Both 
AFCEE and USACE use past performance ratings stored in this system as a factor to 
determine future contract awards (Cassidy 2011). 
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Department of Defense guidance suggests written feedback formed around the 
following performance measures: 
1. Quality of Work 
2. Timely Performance 
3. Effectiveness of Management 
4. Compliance with Safety Standards 
5. Compliance with Labor Standards 
According to CCASS policy Quality of Work is meant to rate, “the contractor’s 
management of the quality control program, as well as the quality of work” (DoD 2011).  
Some suggested areas for comment include: failure to identify and correct deficient work, 
inadequate reviews of materials or shop drawings, and inadequate quality control 
documentation.  All areas receiving criticism are to provide supporting documentation 
and suggestions for improvement (DoD 2011).  Therefore, it is crucial that these agencies 
keep accurate records and document performance to keep contractors and their agency’s 
PMs and QAs accountable.   
Key Performance Indicators - Industry 
The construction industry argues that project success is often an abstract concept 
and difficult to measure.  Beyond the “iron triangle” of cost, schedule and quality is an 
ongoing debate on what other important criteria should be used by the industry to 
measure quality and success.  The use of multiple key performance measures is widely 
accepted, but their application varies from project to project (Parfitt and Sanvido 1993).     
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Chan, a prolific writer on the topic of construction success, suggested that projects 
are dependent on the outcome of several overarching critical success factors (CSFs) and 
also specific key performance indicators (KPIs).  The CSFs are likened to overarching 
predictors of project success.  Before a project begins, the formula of scope, procurement 
type, project management capability, participant teamwork, and environmental factors 
can be identified and accounted.  KPIs are suggested to evaluate actual project 
performance as the construction commences through completion.  There are many 
opinions what key performance indicators should be utilized (A. A. Chan 2004).   
Several researchers argue that project success fits into two main categories: “the 
hard, objective, tangible, and measureable” and the “soft, subjective, intangible and less 
measurable” (A. P. Chan 2002).  The objective criteria are measures such as time, cost, 
financial performance, and health and safety.  The subjective include quality, meeting 
project objectives, functionality, productivity, satisfaction, dispute resolution, 
environmental factors, and aesthetics.  Objective measures would be in terms of a 
percentage overrun or a specific target.  Subjective measures would be evaluated from the 
opinions of key project participants with a qualitative measurement and quantitative 
measure or scale.   
A meta-analysis of project criteria completed in 2002 showed the relative 
frequency of performance measures.  In summary, the following measures were distilled 
further and the following were promoted by multiple studies: 
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Table 1 - Industry Key Performance Measures 
 
 
 
 
Objective measures are often best evaluated be in terms of a percentage overrun for a 
specific target.  Subjective measures would be evaluated from the opinions of key project 
participants with a qualitative measurement and/or a quantitative measure or scale (A. P. 
Chan 2002).   
The industry desires to determine the most applicable criteria for a given project 
or contract type and the appropriate method of measurement, but there is no consensus.  
Little can be found to determine appropriate measures for success in a wartime or 
contingency environment in addition to industry findings for international construction 
(S. G. Arditi 2005).  In order to determine the most appropriate measures of performance 
for Iraq and Afghanistan, it may be beneficial to determine what unique aspects of 
contingency construction impact the success of projects and adjust existing commercial 
industry measures.  It may also be applicable to include statistical data and/or spatial 
references as additional subjective KPIs in these harsh and difficult construction 
environments (Baloi and Price 2002). 
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Project Performance Risk Factors in Iraq and Afghanistan  
Since the start of the Iraq reconstruction in 2003 the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has produced over 200 reports on the status of the stabilization and 
rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The reports cover a variety of topics and issues as a 
snapshot in time.  They bring to light shortcomings and areas for improvement as each 
facet of the effort is evaluated.  Aspects of contingency contracting and construction 
management are strewn throughout most these documents, while about two dozen focus 
primarily on DoD, US Department of State (State) and US Aid for International 
Development (USAID) construction contracts (GAO 2011). 
Internal Performance Risks 
The majority of GAO reports focus on the need for internal organizational 
improvements.  Items identified include the need for increased qualified contract 
administrative and oversight personnel, and improved contract planning, management 
and accountability techniques (GAO 2011).  In a 2007 report, contract issues were said to 
be continuing specifically because of the DOD’s inability to properly define and solidify 
requirements, risky contract arrangements without proper oversight, absence of 
leadership, and too few trained personnel to oversee contractor performance (Walker 
2007). 
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Table 2 - Internal Risk Factors 
 
 
 
 
The factors in Table 2 highlight the recurring internal problems for major 
contingency construction efforts dating back to previous reports from conflicts produced 
in 1992 and again in 1997(Francis 2011).  These factors are listed in order of frequency 
from numerous GAO reports and findings.  The impact of these continuing problems 
make DoD contracts more vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement.  It also 
can result in higher costs, increased delays, and unmet project objectives among other 
issues (Walker 2007).  The complicating factors of outside influences such as poor 
security, unskilled tradesmen, and faulty materials is said to heighten the impact of such 
problems and outcomes (Walker 2007, Thibault and others 2011, SIGAR 2011).      
“The mismatch between wants, needs, affordability, and sustainability” often 
results in poor outcomes with an open-ended contract (Schinasi 2006).  “Undefinitized” 
contract obligations are one example of a recurring shortcoming with high impact.  For 
example, rapidly changing requirements led one project to be modified from $1M to over 
$200M in 2003.  Difficulty in projecting construction costs has also led to large amounts 
of project delays and descoping (Schinasi 2006).  For instance, water projects in Iraq 
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faced significant delays on 18 of 24 sites in 2005 due to scope conflicts ( J. A. Christoff 
2005). 
As noted in Table 2, insufficient numbers of qualified contract management 
personnel are a continued weakness in contingencies.  One GAO report states the 
possible impacts: “If surveillance is not conducted, not sufficient, or not well 
documented, the DoD is at risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor 
performance in a timely manner and potentially paying too much for the services it 
receives” (Walker 2007).     
GAO audits have been beneficial for identifying problems and tasks for 
improvement; however, the agencies are left to determine how best to fix the problem.  
This freedom allows the agencies to continue work while increasing their focus on certain 
issues, but it is difficult to examine strategies for systemic change when there is a mission 
to accomplish.  The numbers of contracts and contractor personnel actions have almost 
doubled over the last decade, while the number of government employees managing 
these contracts has decreased.  Most problems are often only partially fixed with new 
polices, guidance or training programs and the underlying issues remain largely 
unchanged.  There is a movement in the DoD to in-source more expertise and better train 
and retain personnel, but there is still much work to be done (Francis 2011).   
External Performance Risks 
 External risks to contract performance play a substantial role in the success of 
overseas and especially contingency projects (GAO 2011, SIGAR 2011).   However, 
there is little that organizations can do to predict and prevent externalities and 
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environmental factors (Baloi and Price 2002).  The most an organization can do is to 
identify issues when selecting a project site and then mitigate the factors that cannot be 
changed.  In several GAO reports it was mentioned that DoD agencies should take more 
precautions to know and understand the project site characteristics before developing a 
contract (GAO 2011, Thibault and others 2011).     
Influential external risk factors to government contingency construction were 
recorded in multiple audits and reports.  The following table illustrates the tabulation of 
the most predominant risk factors found in order of frequency: 
 
 
 
Table 3 - External Risk Factors 
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Each risk factor has the ability to have a lasting impact on overall project success.  For 
example, “at one project, a lead employee received a life-threatening e-mail. The 
employee was subsequently chased by two armed men and fled the country” (J. A. 
Christoff 2005).   The majority of his employees refused to come to work for weeks.  In 
another instance three construction sites were identified, but after award two fell under 
contention due to squatters and a third had an environmental issue.  The project was 
subsequently cancelled (J. A. Christoff 2005).   
In an unstable external environment that requires frequently changing 
requirements, it is not difficult to understand how contracts can easily go over time and 
budget.  The need for quick execution and obligation of funds often results in poorly 
defined contracts.  In a location where security and political complications are the norm 
rather than the exception, it is not difficult to see why contracts overseas are high-risk 
endeavors (Walker 2007).    
Construction Project Lifecycle 
The lifecycle of a large-scale construction project in Iraq or Afghanistan from 
identification to award and from construction start to final closeout involves several key 
players.  In this section, the involvement of functional process owner will be discussed 
and then placed within the context of the project lifecycle.  Then external influences and 
interactions will be introduced to illustrate a typical contingency construction project life-
cycle.   
Overseas Acquisition Process 
From the time a project is identified and taken on for execution until the time it is 
awarded, many layers of organizations have touched or molded the project’s resources, 
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requirements and expectations.  Like most construction projects, the customer is the 
initiator.  This customer may be a battlespace owner, a regional command’s engineering 
cell, or from a military mentor group for a new government force that requests a project 
through their higher headquarters.  For the USACE and AFCEE, the direct customer is 
usually the military engineer staff for the command in Iraq or Afghanistan.  These 
military engineer staffs, the United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) or the Combined Security 
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) are expected to provide funding, an initial 
site assessment and a statement of requirements for projects (Mayo 2010). 
USACE or AFCEE is responsible for reviewing the project requirements and 
preparing a Request for Proposal (RFP) package for bid.  The engineers assigned to the 
project are responsible for understanding the requirements requested and clarifying any 
questions for contracting personnel.  The reach back cell either in country or stateside is 
responsible the RFP and much of the award process (Mayo 2010).   
During the RFP build for AFCEE, the execution agent staff completes the 
statement of work, specifications and Independent Government Estimate (IGE).  From 
there, legal, contracting and possibly a Multi-function Independent Review Team (MIRT) 
provide feedback and direction for change.  Then the agent’s contracting authority issues 
the RFP.  The contractors deliver their proposals for evaluation and the staff has a panel 
of engineers perform technical evaluations.  The agent in charge of the project completes 
a technical evaluation.  Contracting conducts a price review.  Then contracting selects the 
appropriate contractor based on a set of pre-determined criteria.  Either Lowest Price 
Technically Acceptable or Best Value (Tradeoff) is chosen after a series of reviews with 
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legal and possibly a MIRT if over fifty million dollars.  Then the project is awarded 
(Mayo 2010).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Acquisition Key Event Timeline  (Mayo 2010) 
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In Figure 2, the acquisition process is illustrated as a simplified timeline.  In Chapter 3: 
Methodology, the acquisition timeline for AFCEE will be evaluated further to determine 
average contact award times in comparison to US construction. 
Overseas Construction Management 
From the point of project award, the pre-construction through project closeout 
process begins.  Like any other construction project there are:  kick-off meetings, design 
reviews, weekly meetings, quality control and quality assurance discussions, invoice 
reviews, contract change processes, contractor evaluations, and turnover and closeout 
requirements.  The following figure illustrates key participants throughout the 
contingency construction management process. 
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Figure 3 - Construction Project Key Event Timeline  (Mayo 2010) 
 
 
 
AFCEE Construction Management Practices 
For AFCEE there are a few interactions of interest to point out.  Since there are 
only a few government representatives in theater, a large amount of project management 
occurs in San Antonio, rather than in Afghanistan or Iraq.  For example, during the pre-
construction phase, there are two kick-off meetings, one stateside with key players for the 
contracting relationships and another in country with the customer representatives, 
AFCEE-A and contractor representatives on the in theater.  The first meeting is primarily 
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to define their roles and responsibilities for contracting.  The second is to introduce the 
key players and interested parties while beginning discussion for design, construction, 
and enabling logistics and security requirements on the ground (Mayo 2010).  
A second item of note for AFCEE construction is the use of contracted Title II 
Quality Assurance (QA) and GEITA engineering and construction support.  The Third 
Country National (TCN) QA contactors provide daily supervision on the project site, 
“ensuring the construction contractor is properly implementing the quality control plan” 
(Mayo 2010).  The QA provides reports, notices and inspection letters to the AFCEE-A 
COR/PM.  They also have a cell that reviews technical drawing submittals.  GEITA 
expatriates provide additional support to the COR/PM for management activities.  The 
COR/PM is responsible for oversight on several projects so he or she is only present on 
the site whenever possible.  The COR/PM is responsible to provide feedback to the 
stateside Contract Program Manager when any issues that cannot be dealt with in country 
arise.  Letters of Concern, Corrective Action Requests and Cure Notices are all decided in 
AFCEE-SA by the Contracting Officer (CO) and COR/PM with AFCEE-A COR/PM 
input (Mayo 2010).  
A third item of interest is AFCEE-SA COR/PM.  This person is the stateside 
project manager that completes administrative duties and serves as the continuity for their 
Afghanistan or Iraq COR/PM counterpart.  Since the deployed COR/PM is only in theater 
for 6 months at a time, this relationship is important to maintain.  Items such as project 
performance documentation, requests for letters of concern, CCASS ratings, work change 
requests, and invoice reviews are all funneled to the AFCEE-SA COR/PM (Mayo 2010).  
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USACE Construction Management Practices 
For USACE there are also some unique processes to note.  The first is their 
method of tracking project performance.  The Corps uses their Resident Management 
System (RMS) to facilitate QA in the management of construction projects.  All pertinent 
information regarding construction administration and Quality Control (QC) 
requirements is tracked for ease of oversight by this system.  Since their project tracking 
process is similar to other USACE districts the amount of spin-up time is minimal for 
their personnel.  The contractors are responsible to learn the system and provide 
continuous schedule and progress reports, input invoices and basic subcontractor 
information to ensure payments are made to all parties at appropriate times through this 
system (AED-N 2010). 
The Corps also has over 26 COs and 81 CORs in Afghanistan.  Their goal is to 
have as many personnel as possible deploy from stateside districts to support the staffing 
of their deployed districts in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they have had some 
difficultly retaining qualified personnel in theater with their high staffing demand.  They 
have hired some engineers from outside the government and have also offered a number 
of incentives to further increase their available personnel in theater.  Some QA personnel 
have also been hired from the local populace (Dorko 2011).  
A third point of interest is the USACE institution of an Intelligence Infusion 
Center (IFC).  This center uses sensors and other technologies to perform some initial site 
selection planning.  They are able to identify site characteristics such as terrain, soil 
condition, and location of local land use from afar.  This further enables far-reaching 
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projects such as roads and sites that might be difficult to visit with manpower available 
(Dorko 2011).  
Methodology Development 
The most frequently discussed methods for performance measure development 
and analysis are:  various extensive literature reviews, expert questionnaires, Delphi 
studies, Analytic Hierarchy Processes (AHP), and Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) (S. 
G. Arditi 2005, Arditi and Gunaydin 1999, Hyun and others 2008, A. P. Chan 2002).  To 
determine the most appropriate method for this research it is appropriate to review each 
methodology and its related outcomes. 
Literature Review Coupled with Questionnaire 
Extensive literature reviews are helpful to gather all of the expert opinions on a 
subject and can be used to create a conceptual framework.  However, literature alone can 
make it difficult to create an accepted consensus view for practical application.  Expert 
questionnaires without extensive literature on the other hand result in a hierarchy of 
opinion, but there isn’t much guidance in the process on generating additional concepts or 
comments.  In addition, the use of survey questions alone has the potential to be poorly 
written or skew ideas and responses inadvertently without a check to balance the outcome 
(Okoli and Pawlowski 2004).  By combining literature review and questionnaire 
development and analysis, it is possible to aggregate information categorically into 
logical patterns and to evaluate written comments through interpretation and checks with 
similar literature findings (Stake 1995).   
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Analysis of Variance 
Statistical analysis is a powerful tool for finding relationships within large 
amounts of data.  Trend evaluation and correlations through the one-way bivariate 
analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA) are common tools to identify interactions 
between independent and dependant variables.  In the investigation of existing Iraq and 
Afghanistan project data, the completion of a bivariate analysis and the ANOVA will be 
the most useful. 
One-way or bivariate analysis is used to determine the impact of a continuous 
independent variable, X, on a continuous dependent variable, Y.  Bivariate analysis 
evaluates the relationship or correlation between only two variables at a time.  The 
resultant output is an X versus Y scatter plot graph featuring a fit trend line, RSquare 
adjusted goodness of fit measure, and error rates (Paul Newbold 2010).   
The one-way ANOVA is used to determine the impact of categorical independent 
variables, Xi, on the continuous dependent variable, Y.  The result is a graph and 
statistical output depicting mean, mean difference, and percent deviations within Xi 
variables and the overall mean trend and between variables, with Prob > F, or Prob > t 
and p-values for standard error rates required to reject the null hypothesis (Institute 
2012). 
Evaluating Performance Indicators 
The selection of project performance measures has both objective and subjective 
elements, just as the measures themselves have these same attributes (A. A. Chan 2004). 
To determine the most appropriate performance measures for Iraq and Afghanistan, an 
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overarching method of analysis must be selected for this study.  Since performance 
measures have been evaluated in construction industry by numerous combinations of 
quantitative and qualitative methods, a choosing by advantages decision-making tool was 
used to select the preferred method for this analysis (A. A. Chan 2004).    
 
 
 
Table 4 - CBA -Initial Methodology Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
Since a quantitative methodology was chosen as the most desirable, the results for 
performance measure analysis will be primarily evaluated numerically.  The 
characteristics of a qualitative methodology also offer distinct advantages to better 
understand influencing factors on performance.  Therefore, quantitative and qualitative 
measures were chosen for use in the methodology.     
Methodology Selection 
For the purposes of this research the use of a combination of the survey and 
ANOVA will be utilized.  First the survey method will be used to determine the most 
influential performance indicators and rank them with a panel of experts.  An ANOVA 
will also be executed to evaluate existing objective performance data.  The combination 
of methods will help to triangulate available data from literature review, expert opinions 
on performance criteria, and the evaluation of existing performance data.  The result will 
assist in the determination of how we might effectively measure contingency contract 
performance in the future, so that the impact of contract type and other contingency risks 
can be evaluated.     
Information Databases 
MACTEC Master Plans 
MACTEC is a Title I services contractor under AFCEE’s 4PAE contract.  Title I 
services can include all aspects of design as well as field surveys and investigations, 
contract plans and cost estimates.  In Afghanistan, their primary tasks are basic field 
surveys and site master plans (Mayo 2010). 
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Each year MACTEC produces the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development.  This electronic document compiles and 
outlines the topical data most leaders would request concerning ANSF base data.  Most 
project files contain boundary site coordinates, a short narrative outlining current state 
and future plans, as well as maps, any facility plans and excel spreadsheets with cost data 
(MACTEC 2011).   
AFCEE Project Tracking System (PTS) 
AFCEE’s Project Tracking System (PTS) is an online data management system 
for task order (project) oversight.  This system gathers data and generates reports on 
internal project management processes and also retains general project performance data 
and weekly task order progress reports.  Under the Reports tab is the Project Management 
Reports tab which contains a data file entitled “Schedule Growth Metric” that keeps real 
time percent cost and schedule growth metrics for each AFCEE project.  Another report 
entitled, “Acquisition Timeline Metric” retains the major handoffs and deadlines for task 
order solicitation and award.  The reports cannot be queried online, so the files are MS 
Excel downloadable (Holguin 2011).  These files will be discussed further in the 
methodology discussion of chapter 3.   
USACE Resident Management System/Quality Control System (RMS/QCS) 
USACE’s Resident Management System (RMS) is a networked data management 
system for multiple facets of project management.  This system is used by government 
QA personnel to input management and administrative data to perform project planning 
and performance tracking.  The other half of the system is the Quality Control System 
(QCS) which is accessible for use by construction contractors.  Contactors are required to 
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provide all major construction administrative submittals and requests into this system.  
The information from these systems is used by USACE to track contract performance and 
store it in a single location (AED-N 2010).    
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
 
 
Research Method 
The mixed method approach to research is the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative strategies.  This concept was developed around the research philosophy that a 
single investigative approach is incapable of producing the accurate and reliable study on 
its own (Creswell 2003). When performing only quantitative analysis, data may be 
lacking or can possibly be misaligned from the topic of study (Hyun and others 2008).  In 
some instances, quantitative results have been known to conflict with the perceptions of 
actual workers.  In qualitative research, the wording of questions can inadvertently 
indicate an unintended or misinterpreted response (Creswell 2003, Okoli and Pawlowski 
2004). 
In the pragmatic approach of mixed methods, where quantitative measures are 
impossible to gather or are unable to explain phenomenon, qualitative tools are 
indispensible to turn soft measures and information into hard data.  A quantitative 
analysis coupled with qualitative response and mixed methods analysis produces a more 
complete picture of an existing state (Creswell 2003).  This research utilizes quantitative 
analysis on existing construction project data for cost and schedule performance in part I 
and uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative responses/analysis in the survey process in 
part II to validate the part I results and receive expert opinions on other performance 
indicators for construction success.   
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Statistical Analysis of Existing Project Data  
The online AFCEE Project Management System contained two  useful reports with 
objective project performance data for Iraq and Afghanistan: 
1. Acquisition Timeline Metric 
2. Cost and Schedule Growth Metric 
The project data in these files provided the basis for the statistical analysis of accessible 
existing performance measurements for this portion of study.   
Acquisition Performance Analysis 
The Acquisition Timeline Metric is used to track the progress of each task order 
from the deli of a Statement of Requirements (SOR) through actual award.  Each project 
is identified by a title, independent government estimate, and awarded contractor title.  
 The first objective for analysis was to determine if any trends existed between 
process milestones and the efficiency of those process owners in comparison to the 
overall completion of the acquisition process.  The second purpose was to determine if 
any statistical correlation exists between project scope, location, or fiscal year and the 
acquisition timeline execution.  
To complete the bivariate analysis, the data from the Acquisition Timeline Metric was 
first entered into JMP® version 9, statistical analysis software.  Any incomplete or 
missing project acquisition data was removed from the file.  Data was also filtered so 
only construction task orders above $2M were analyzed.  This was done to eliminate a 
number of small projects that were deemed to be outliers during the initial data analysis.  
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These projects were small environmental, design, and Title I and II services, which are 
not part of the overall much larger project focused AFCEE contingency construction 
program which was the focus of this research.     
Table 5 highlights the variables that were studied between internal acquisition 
process owners, the external variable of project scope and their impact on acquisition 
process completion. 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Acquisition Analysis Variables 
                  
 
 
 
By using the “Fit Y by X” tool in JMP®, the resultant analysis was a bivariate analysis for 
each independent (X) variable, acquisition process stage, against the dependent (Y) 
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variable, Overall Acquisition Time.  Results and interpretation are discussed in Chapter 
4: Results and Discussion.       
Cost and Schedule Growth Analysis 
The second report that was analyzed was the Cost and Schedule Growth Metric.  
This metric tracks the percentage cost and time growth for each project.  These two 
performance indicators are the quantitative tools currently utilized to help measure 
overall project health.   
First, percent cost growth was analyzed with respect to the independent (Xi) 
variables in Table 6 against the dependent (Y) variable, Percent Cost Growth.  This 
indicated if any ties existed between internal or external project factors and project cost 
growth.  Second, percent schedule growth was analyzed with respect to the independent 
(Xi) variables in against the dependent (Y) variable, Percent Schedule Growth.  This 
indicated if any ties exist between external project factors and project schedule growth.  
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Table 6 - Cost and Schedule Variables 
                  
 
 
 
To complete the analysis, the data from the Cost and Schedule Growth Metric was 
placed into the JMP® software program.  Next, the projects were once again filtered to 
include only completed construction in Iraq and Afghanistan over $2M for initial project 
cost.  Then, the Fit Y by X statistical tool was used to initiate the one-way ANOVA, and 
then to pull the studentized pooled t-test statistics for the two-tailed probabilities.   
The resultant one-way analysis and ANOVA outputs are tabulated and presented 
in Chapter 4, describing possible trends and the significance of the findings.  The result 
of the Acquisition Performance analysis identifies if there are ties between various 
project factors and acquisition delays.  The result of Cost and Schedule Growth Analysis 
will determine if these external project factors are tied to objective performance of 
AFCEE construction contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq to date.    
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Questionnaire  
The survey method of analysis was a multiple step procedure.  A pool of expert 
participants associated with AFCEE construction was selected, a set of questions was 
developed based on similar survey samples found and reviewed for any bias, the survey 
was administered, and a statistical analysis of the results was accomplished.  Potential 
survey participants were identified based on their position and experience with 
construction operations within Afghanistan or Iraq.  The selection of personnel was based 
on a literature review of documents identifying key positions involved in construction 
during the life of a construction project.  Expatriate, third country, and local construction 
contractors, planners and quality assurance personnel were the target survey participants.   
The survey was administered by AFCEE staff in Afghanistan and was conducted 
voluntarily and confidentially through a web-based questionnaire.  Questions were 
developed based on survey formats found for similar past studies and from key 
performance measures and risk factors from the literature review.  The questionnaire 
invitation and web-link was sent directly through e-mail to leaders in all the organizations 
involved with AFCEE construction in Iraq and Afghanistan and then could be forwarded 
to its employees.  Demographic questions were used only identify the depth of the sample 
population in terms of the positions and amount experience levels that were represented 
in the results.  Demographic information is available in Appendix D: Survey Data and 
Analysis. 
Measures 
The questions were developed based on identifiers and measures of project 
success compiled from the literature review.  The questions were designed to bring out 
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the most influential impacts to project success for Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Firm Fixed 
Price contracts, ranging from internal organizational structures to external causes, such as 
security threats.   
The questionnaire consisted of four parts and a total of 39 questions on their 
expert opinions of contingency contracts and 6 demographics questions.  The questions 
were designed to measure if there were any differences between Cost Plus and Firm 
Fixed Price contracts for: each construction stage, the influence of internal factors, the 
influence of external factors, and overall performance.  The questionnaire also included a 
comments section for each question, a chance to suggest additional influencing factors 
and scale their impact at the end of the main questionnaire, and a chance to give their 
opinions on construction in Iraq and Afghanistan and views on the strengths and 
weaknesses of each contract type in the part four, comments section.  All questions in 
parts one through three were measured using a 7-point Likert-type response scale.  
Questions in part four were for written comments only.  The questionnaire that was 
deployed can be found in Appendix B.  The statistical analysis completed to evaluate the 
responses and the results are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Part One.   
Seven questions were asked relating to how influential the decisions at each stage 
of the construction process and overall impact on the success of projects.  An example 
question is, “How influential is the execution of the Design Stage on overall project 
success with respect to time, cost, and quality?” For each question the participant 
responded with respect to cost, time, and quality impacts to both Cost Plus and Firm 
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Fixed Price contracts.  The hypothesis was that the impact to success would differ for 
Cost Plus and Firm Fixed Price during each stage of the process, due to the nature of the 
costs and benefits inherent in the contract types for each player.  For example, it might be 
expected that the success of the design stage would be most influential for time and cost 
for Cost Plus, because requirements are generally assumed to be less well-defined by the 
government.   
Part Two.   
Thirteen questions were asked relating to how much internal project factors affect 
the success of projects.  Internal factors are persons, places or things that are within your 
organization's realm of influence.  Factors may include: organizational processes and 
support structures, employees, and quality of deliverables.  In this survey internal factors 
were drawn from previous trends found in studies by the GAO, SIGIR, SIGAR, and 
Congressional Commissions as described in the literature review.  An example question 
from the survey is, “How influential are the Number and Availability of Trained 
Acquisition Personnel on the success of a contract?”  For each question the participant 
responded with respect the degree of impact to overall success for Cost Plus and also 
Firm Fixed Price contracts.  Previous studies from the GAO formed the hypothesis for 
this section that internal factors may contribute more to the success or failure of a project 
than external factors.   
Part Three.   
Ten questions were asked relating to how much external project factors affect the 
success of projects.  External Factors are persons, places or things that are outside of your 
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realm of influence.  Such factors include: weather, terrorists, economic conditions, and 
other environmental factors outside of an organization's control.  In this survey some of 
the most commonly noted external factors were also drawn from previous trends found in 
studies described in the literature review.  An example question from the survey is, “To 
what degree do Local Political Pressures impact the success of a contract?”  For each 
question the participant responded with respect the degree of impact to overall success 
for Cost Plus and also Firm Fixed Price contracts.  At the end of this section participants 
were given the opportunity to suggest any internal or external factors not mentioned and 
rate their impact on success.  
Part Four.   
Eight questions were asked relating to overall thoughts on project success and 
contract types.  Four questions requested the respondents to use the open comments 
section to describe their opinion and the government’s opinion of project success, and 
their opinion on which contract vehicle was the best.  The final four questions were a 
simple selection of which is better: Cost Plus or Firm Fixed Price.  The hypothesis for 
this section was that neither contract type was better than the other in terms of overall 
success in a contingency environment.  Also, that each would have unique advantages 
and disadvantages with respect to cost, time, and quality.        
The following, shown in Figure 4, illustrates the nature of questions that were 
posed in each section of survey.  The map shows how the questions attempt to shed light 
not only on the myriad of influencing factors on construction in the AOR, and also shows 
how those factors map to three overarching hypotheses of the survey.  
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Figure 4 - Questionnaire Map to Hypotheses 
 
 
 
This section described the participants and the design and deployment of the 
contract type questionnaire.  The description of the statistical analysis, final results, and 
discussion of the questionnaire are included in Chapter 4.  The questions, responses, 
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calculations, and additional data are available for review in Appendix B: Cost Plus 
Versus Firm Fixed Questionnaire and Appendix D: Survey Data and Analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Results and Discussion 
 
 
 
Acquisition Performance Results 
 A bivariate Fit Y by X analysis was conducted for the acquisition timeline report 
data.  Both variables remained as continuous data.  This was done to see if there was a 
pure correlation (effect created) between the time it takes to a process owner to 
accomplish their tasks and its impact on the time it takes to complete the overall 
acquisition process.     
 
 
 
Table 7 - Acquisition Performance 
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As shown in Table 7, the values that indicate a possible correlation for this analysis 
technique are RSquare Adjusted Values and Prob > F (p-value).  If RSquare is greater 
than 0.50 it is possible a strong correlation may exist, and if Prob > F is less than 0.05 
then the results are statistically significant.  The results indicate that field workers 
developing the Statement of Requirements tend to have the greatest positive or negative 
impact on the acquisition process and time to award, followed by the contract award 
phase and then the Request for Proposal phase of the acquisition process.   
Statistical Cost and Schedule Growth Results  
 A combination of bivariate (simple regression) and Means/ANOVA and 
studentized t-test statistics were executed in JMP® in this statistical cost and schedule 
growth analysis.  Data from a total of 127 AFCEE construction projects from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the United States awarded in fiscal year 2006 through 2010 were used 
for this study.  The first tables for cost and schedule growth focus on the overall 
performance of construction contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The second tables for 
cost and schedule growth go more in-depth to evaluate performance characteristics based 
on contract type, country, fiscal year, and percent of construction complete at the time of 
the analysis.   
 Table 8 shows the results of bivariate and one-way analyses and indicates percent 
cost growth trends of note for overall construction performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.     
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Table 8 - External Factors and Percent Cost Growth 
 
 
 
 
The values in the table that indicate a possible correlation for this analysis technique are 
RSquare Adjusted Values and Prob > F.  If RSquare is greater than 0.50 it is possible a 
strong correlation may exist, and if Prob > F is less than 0.05 then the results of the 
regression are statistically significant.  The results indicate that there is only one 
statistically significant result.  Still, a few trends were discovered by visual inspection of 
the data and were indicated.  It appears that larger projects tend to have less cost growth, 
two contractors have less cost growth than the others, and that over time, Iraq and 
Afghanistan have improved as indicated by a declining percent cost growth trend for 
completed projects.  These trends cannot be validated, because the results are not 
significant.  An example of a one-way means/ANOVA output from JMP® is shown in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 - Example ANOVA Output 
  
 
 
Table 9 shows the results of the more in-depth analysis of cost growth for AFCEE 
contracts.  The first section evaluates Afghanistan and US Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
construction performance.  AFCEE in Iraq did not execute FFP construction.  The second 
section compares FFP and Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract performance in 
Afghanistan.  The third analyzes CPFF in Afghanistan versus Iraq.   
The mean values are the average percent cost growth, the difference is the 
comparison of the two means (i.e. US, FFP, > 95% complete versus Afghanistan, FFP, > 
 
 
50 
95% complete).  The Upper and Lower 95% give the 95% confidence interval for the true 
difference between the means.  If the confidence interval contains zero then there is no 
significant difference. The p-value is the two-tailed test for rejection the null hypothesis 
that the mean difference is zero.  If the p-value is less than 0.05 the null is rejected and 
we can conclude there is a significant difference between the means.  The Prob > F is the 
two-tailed p-value for the significance of the overall model.   
 
 
 
Table 9 - Percent Cost Growth 
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It is interesting to note that although the US tends to outperform Afghanistan on 
the completed FFP projects that were evaluated, there is not a statistically significant 
difference between the percent cost growths of these two countries.  Also, FFP in 
Afghanistan does appear to also outperform the whole of CPFF projects executed in 
Afghanistan, but there is not a statistically significant difference to overturn the null that 
the means are the same.   Iraq projects also had a lower mean average percent cost growth 
than Afghanistan, but the results were not conclusive.   
Percent schedule growth bivariate analysis results in Table 10 were analyzed and 
calculated in the same way as the results in Table 8 - External Factors and Percent Cost 
Growth. 
 
 
 
Table 10 - External Factors and Percent Schedule Growth 
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There is a statistically significant finding for this analysis that indicates a slight 
improvement in reducing schedule growth over time for both Iraq and Afghanistan 
construction.  It is also interesting to point out that contractor 4, which performed well in 
terms of average cost growth, also appears to have had less schedule growth on average.  
The same trend was also found in percent schedule growth as was found for percent cost 
growth that larger projects tend to perform better. 
 The results in Table 11 for percent schedule growth were evaluated in the same 
fashion as percent cost growth in Table 9. 
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Table 11 - Percent Schedule Growth 
 
 
 
 
There was too little US data containing percent schedule growth of completed 
projects to perform an analysis of that parameter.  There were statistically significant 
differences between the mean percent schedule growth of completed CPFF and FFP 
projects in Afghanistan.  Firm Fixed Price does outperform Cost Plus.  It also appears 
that incomplete projects from Iraq had less schedule growth than those underway in 
Afghanistan based on the data evaluated at the time.  In terms of country specific 
improvements, the comparison of CPFF projects in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008 with 
2009-2011 showed a statistically significant improvement over time.       
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Questionnaire Results 
 There were 20 responses to the questionnaire from the AFCEE initiated online 
survey.  Program and project managers, government and contractor, quality assurance 
personnel, and construction leadership and contracting personnel were invited to 
participate in the study.  There was representation from all of these fields, to include 
personnel with past experience as project engineers, and site superintendents.  Average 
construction experience in Iraq and Afghanistan for the sample was 5.2 years.  Average 
number of years in the field of construction was 24.5 years. More detailed demographic 
information can be found in Table 25 - Demographics Data located in Appendix D: 
Survey Data and Analysis.    
Overall Questionnaire Results 
The first three tables in the analysis show the statistical analysis of our overall 
survey responses by category.  All data analysis was performed through a paired t-test 
utilizing a matched pairs analysis.  The Upper and Lower 95% and Prob > t indicate if 
there is a significant difference between the two means (CPFF vs. FFP responses).  
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Table 12 - Construction Phases and Overall Impacts to Performance 
 
 
 
 
The first table compiles the responses for construction phases.  The only comparisons of 
the contract type means that were statistically significant were the overall influence on 
performance and the success of projects with respect to quality.  CPFF contracts had the 
most influence and success for both responses.  For both FFP and CPFF the construction 
phase had the greatest influence on the overall cost of projects, followed by design, 
planning and finally red zone.  For time influences, the most crucial stage was 
construction followed by a tie between planning and designs for FFP, and for CPFF 
design followed by planning.  For quality, the most influential stages were construction, 
design, and then red zone.  These results indicate that our original hypothesis was 
incorrect.  The construction stage, instead of the initial planning and requirements stage 
 
 
56 
was the most influential on success of FFP.  And the construction stage, not the design 
stage was the most influential on success of CPFF.      
 
 
 
Table 13 - Internal Impacts to Performance 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 - Internal Impacts to Performance, was developed to rate the most 
influential internal influencing factors on construction success in terms of CPFF and FFP 
contracts.  There were several statistically different performance factors resulting from 
the analysis.  User expectations for example were believed to have more impact on the 
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success of a CPFF contract versus FFP.  Overall, the most influential internal impact on 
performance was the contractor’s efficiency and organization.  For FFP the next most 
influential performance factors were the number of trained government acquisition 
personnel, followed by internal supply issues.  The next most influential for CPFF were 
handling user expectations, followed by trained construction oversight personnel.  The 
least influential for FFP and CPFF were accidents and safety violations followed by the 
quality of the government’s definition of project requirements.  The overall impact to 
cost, time, and quality by internal factors had the most influence on the success of CPFF 
projects.  Time, followed by quality were the most impacted performance measures from 
internal influences.  
 External influencing factors on performance were evaluated next.  Table 14 shows 
the results of the analysis.     
 
 
 
Table 14 - External Impacts to Performance 
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There were few statistical differences in this section and the perceived impact of 
those measures on performance was minimal.  Overall, the most influential external 
impact on performance was the subcontractor workforce.  For FFP the next most 
influential was site location followed by external supply issues.  For CPFF the next 
influential measures were construction labor workforce and external supply issues.  The 
least influential factor for both was local economic factors.  The overall impact to time, 
cost, and quality were most influential on FFP contract success.  For FFP external factors 
had the most perceived impact on time, followed by cost.  For CPFF cost and time were 
perceived as the most influential.  These responses appear to line up with the traditional 
definitions of cost type and firm fixed type contracts and their influences on dealing with 
project risk (GSA 2010).    
 The next table discusses the results of an overall compilation and analysis of the 
first two questionnaire sections.   
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Table 15 - Overall Survey Responses 
 
 
 
 
The first test combined the outputs of all quantitative survey responses with regards to 
CPFF and FFP contracts.  There was a significant difference in the perceived 
performance of the two contract types overall and Cost Plus construction contracts were 
believed to perform better in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Hypothesis number three from our 
questionnaire analysis was that there was no overall difference between contract types 
and project success.  This hypothesis was rejected.  In terms of cost, time, and quality, it 
appeared that CPFF projects performed better than FFP, and the statistical results indicate 
they are not statistically conclusive.  In terms of the impact of internal and external 
influences on the contracts, the results concluded that there was a significant difference in 
performance and CPFF projects were impacted the most positively in their experience.  
 Table 16 provides some more in-depth survey response comparisons.  Time and 
Cost and Quality were evaluated against each other to determine statistically significant 
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comparisons of the overall data.  The same was done for overall internal and external 
project influences.  
 
 
 
Table 16 - Additional Survey Response Comparisons 
 
 
 
 
There was a strong consensus that quality was impacted most in a contingency 
environment.  There was also a strong indication that internal influencing factors had the 
greatest impact on construction success overall.  Hypothesis two for the questionnaire 
conjectured that internal factors were more influential on project success regardless of 
contract type.  According to the survey analysis, the null hypothesis stands, and cannot be 
rejected.        
 In Table 17 compares responses of time, cost, and quality for CPFF and FFP.  The 
perceived impact on quality for CPFF and FFP is significantly more influential than from 
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cost and time performance, and CPFF quality impacts are significantly more significant 
than FFP quality.  
 
 
 
Table 17 - Additional Survey Response Comparisons - Cost, Time, Quality In-depth 
 
 
 
 
Additional Influencing Factors 
The next portion of data collection allowed the participants to suggest additional 
internal or external influencing factors on performance of the two construction contract 
types.  Table 18 distills the number responses provided and the perceived impact by the 
respondent.    
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Table 18 - Additional Factors Suggested for Consideration 
 
 
 
 
There was a particular interest from the respondents that improvement of government 
COR staff retention and experience was especially important to contract success.  
However, question 14 from the questionnaire also attempted to quantify the same impacts 
on success.  The mean responses were 5.40 for FFP and 5.05 for CPFF and the 
differences were statistically insignificant.  Ethical challenges due to corruption could be 
linked partially to question 27 relating to “local political pressures”.   The mean 
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responses were 5.00 for FFP and 4.20 for CPFF and the differences were statistically 
significant, indicating a widely perceived impact based on contract type.   
Qualitative Responses 
 The third section of questionnaire responses asked overarching questions with 
regards to CPFF and FFP contracts.  This was served as the more qualitative portion of 
the survey that encouraged open-ended responses.  The responses to each question were 
aggregated with a tally and tabulated method of distillation.  The comments were 
analyzed and synthesized through a search for patterns with direct interpretation.  Table 
19 - Perspective Questions, shows the preferred contract type for four of the eight 
questions asked and the overarching reasons provided for the selection.       
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Table 19 - Perspective Questions 
 
 
 
From the contractor perspective, which contract type would you prefer to work on? 
Response Count Comments 
CPFF 
FFP 
Neither 
Risk is on the government. Can be done profitably and with 
17 quality if there are realistic expectations and executed in a timely 
fashion. 
1 None 
1 No difference 
From the perspective of the government, which contract type saves the most money? 
Response Count Comments 
In the long-term, costs are lower. Changes will occur on every 
project. CPFF allows changes with minimal cost impact as long 
as the decision is made quickly and the contractor isn't paid to sit 
CPFF 12 on site while decisons are being made. Under FFP the contractor 
will continue until government issues stop work so it can cost 
more in work stoppage and the loss of money from executed 
work already in place. 
FFP 6 CPFF has large cost overruns in the long-term with claims and 
rework. 
CPFF has lower cost for less defined scopes, conditions, 
Neither 1 evolving mission. FFP is lower for supply and delivery with 
well defined scopes. 
From the perspective of the government, which contract type delivers projects 
faster? 
Response Count Comments 
CPFF 
FFP 
Neither 
7 Faster for emerging areas with less defined scopes and 
conditions, and evolving mission requirements. 
7 FFP has liquidated damages. 
5 Construction takes a set amount of time, or requires trade-offs to 
accomplish faster regardless of contract type. 
From the perspective of the government, which contract type delivers projects with 
the best quality? 
Response Count Comments 
CPFF 
FFP 
Neither 
Government assumes risk so it attracts quality focused 
14 contractors where both parties work toward a common goal. FFP encourages lowest cost and tends to provide bare minimum 
to maximize profit margins. 
0 None 
5 About the same in places like Afghanistan. 
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The other four questions were completely open-ended responses.  The first 
question asked the respondent to describe how they define project success.  Quality end 
products, on time and within budget were the most frequently stated concepts.  
Maximizing cultural/mentoring/host nation resources was next, followed by safe and 
ethically compliant construction, meeting mission requirements, customer satisfaction, 
and sustainable facilities.  Some respondents indicated a steady state relationship within 
the iron triangle, by stating that in a contingency, time was always the lesser of the three 
priorities.  Quality and cost control seemed to be of the greatest importance to a few of 
the respondents.  Few other respondents stated that completion of the project was the 
most important.   
The second question asked the survey taker to provide their thoughts on how they 
perceive the government measures success.  The largest single response was that the 
government emphasizes meeting the schedule.  The next most common responses related 
to lowest cost and staying within budget, followed by quality/safety, and completion of 
the project with minimal changes and bureaucratic hassles.  Responses also indicated the 
importance of mission requirements, customer satisfaction and teamwork with the 
contractor.    
The third question asked for their personal contract type preference for 
contingency construction.  All but two answered with cost plus.  The reasons for 
choosing CPFF were varied.  The single most common response was that it reduces the 
cost impact to both parties when problems arise, which they say is common for these 
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environments.  CPFF provides for the greatest flexibility for change and encourages 
teamwork and input from all parties involved.  A few of the respondents do admit, 
however, that it is does provide more time and generally a guarantee of money for the 
contractors.  They state that it does put the government as the bearer of the greatest risk, 
and that more change orders are expected to occur than in FFP.  However, some believe 
that the government secures better contractors and better quality end products with CPFF, 
because better companies are not willing to take the risk in a contingency environment 
with FFP.   The reasons for choosing FFP by one of the survey takers was that if 
requirements could be better defined up front FFP would provide the best avenue for 
execution.  There is less risk for the government with FFP, and with CPFF contractors 
often give extremely low bids with the expectation of more change orders to bring their 
revenues back up later on in the project.   
The final open-ended question analyzed asked which contract type they have had 
the greatest success with in a contingency and why.  There were nine responses for 
CPFF, three responses for FFP, and three responses stating success with both.  Many of 
the explanations were similar to previous questions for CPFF and FFP.  However, for 
CPFF a few indicated that it was also the best value and had the most realistic pricing, 
and that if there are enough trained and qualified government oversight personnel to 
assist with problems and changing situations, customer satisfaction could be higher.  FFP 
responses indicated that if the project is focused on product rather than process it can be 
successful.  There was also a potential for greater earnings with FFP.  The responses that 
indicated success with both contract types had little to say, but one stated that the 
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government paid the contractor less with CPFF, but there were opportunities for greater 
earnings with FFP.  And another indicated that quality is better with CPFF.            
Questionnaire Discussion 
 Of the three main hypotheses tested in this analysis, none could be rejected.  
Hypothesis one indicated that requirements development in the planning stage was the 
most influential on FFP success and that the design stage was the most important stage 
for CPFF contract success.  In both instances, it was discovered that the construction 
stage appeared to be the most influential, but the differences were not statistically 
significant.  In addition, question 8, government requirements definition, appeared to 
have the least impact on performance in comparison to other internal factors.   
 Hypothesis two indicated that internal factors were the more influential on project 
success, regardless of contract type.  As discussed in the resulting analysis from the 
outputs shown in Table 16, the null hypothesis stood and internal factors we found to be 
statistically more influential than external factors.   
 Hypothesis three stated that there was no significant difference between contract 
type and construction success.  As discussed in the analysis from Table 15, the null 
hypothesis was rejected.  CPFF projects overall were perceived to perform better than 
FFP contracts, and the difference was statistically significant.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
 
Responses to Research Questions 
The following questions were posed as the intent of this research: 
1. How does an agency choose CPFF versus FFP? 
2. What risks are associated with CPFF and FFP contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan? 
3. What measures of performance are used for Iraq and Afghanistan and should 
others be considered for use? 
4. Does one contract type produce a better product based on available data and/or 
determined measures of performance?  
5. How do those results compare to another market, such as the United States?  
Question One 
In response to the first research question, a governmental agency chooses the 
appropriate contract method based on the nature of the project and a set of 
organizationally established criteria evaluated by the Contracting Officer.  The 
Contracting Officer bears the responsibility to determine which type is most appropriate 
based on a number of factors.  Prior to solicitation, future work is evaluated against a 
number of criteria to include: complexity, competition, requirement definition, project 
length and historical data of similar work (Manuel 2010).  Additional information was 
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provided in the literature review of the FAR and other federal and organizational 
guidance.   
Question Two 
The risks associated with CPFF and FFP contracts were studied extensively in the 
literature review of numerous Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports on 
contingency construction, Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction audits, as well as 
transcripts from congressional hearings.  Data was also collected from commercial 
overseas construction risk studies.  The key findings were that contingency construction, 
especially in third world countries, was subject to unique, unpredictable, and often 
unavoidable challenges.  A common trend discovered in a GAO meta-analysis of military 
construction indicated that internal management issues were consistently tied to poor 
performance without learning the lesson.  In terms of military contingencies, many 
lessons-learned from past conflicts were either ineffectually catalogued or were not 
passed on at all to military engineering personnel in the following conflict.  This 
hypothesis was tested in the questionnaire portion of the methodology.  As discussed in 
the resulting analysis from the outputs shown in Table 16, the null hypothesis stood and 
internal factors we found to be statistically more influential than external factors on 
construction performance.  Internal factors were also found to be statistically different for 
FFP and CPFF contracts.  Cost plus contracts were perceived to be influenced the most 
by internal performance factors. 
Question Three  
 The compilation and evaluation of construction performance measures was the 
most varied portion of literature review.  Cost and schedule data were found to be the 
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main “hard” performance measures in use by the government.  The “soft” quality and 
safety oriented CCASS ratings were also used.  In the literature review and questionnaire 
responses the iron triangle remained the “gold-standard” for measurement.  However, 
“softer” quality measures and performance influencing factors were also found to be 
worthy of further analysis.  Internal and externally influenced performance indicators in 
addition to cost, time, and quality were evaluated against each other through a contract 
type questionnaire.  The “soft” performance measures that were perceived to be most 
influential to contract success are in Table 20. 
 
 
 
Table 20 - Influential Questionnaire Performance Measures 
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  Question Four and Five 
The evaluation and comparison of Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Firm Fixed Price 
construction contracts was accomplished throughout this research.  Patterns and practices 
from a contingency environment and the United States were both included in the process.  
In the analysis of existing AFCEE cost and schedule growth data, the mean response data 
for FFP in Afghanistan and in the US indicated consistently less percent cost and 
schedule growth than CPFF projects in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Percent schedule growth 
was shown to be statistically less for FFP in Afghanistan over CPFF.  However, the 
overall data analysis was not able to show any other materially significant differences.  In 
the analysis of the questionnaire responses, there was a consistent perception that CPFF 
projects outperformed FFP with respect to overall contract success, and those results 
were statistically significant.  In addition, quality influences were the only statistically 
different results with-in the iron-triangle.  Quality was perceived as the most influential 
factor to contingency contract success and CPFF quality was believed to be more 
significantly influential on construction success than FFP quality.   
 The results of this study indicated that there was no statistical difference in terms 
of cost performance for FFP and CPFF contracts.  Neither existing data nor survey results 
could establish a significant difference.  For schedule, FFP performed significantly better 
than CPFF projects in a contingency.  For quality performance, the results of the 
questionnaire indicated statistically that CPFF contracts provided a better quality product.             
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 In comparing US and contingency FFP data, the only reliable measure available 
to test in this research was percent cost growth.  The US mean was slightly better, but 
difference between the means was not statistically significant.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 As is the case with any research endeavor, certain limitations could not be 
avoided in the execution of data compilation and analysis.  The gathering of existing 
project performance data from projects can prove difficult to obtain when attempting to 
study subjects that are still ongoing, at a high pace, in a sensitive environment.  In 
addition, some information is not possible to obtain from a distance when it involves 
hundreds of files to be refined for a mass analysis.  For this reason, only a small number 
of US construction project data files could be sent to cull and analyze.  The sum of these 
limitations in gathering available data narrowed the existing project performance criteria 
down to a cost and schedule growth analysis.  
 Within the available data files there were entry errors, missing or incomplete data, 
and information that was extraneous to the analysis.  Information from multiple sheets 
and sources had to be gathered on the same date, since they were all actively in use, and 
built into a useable project file.  For this reason, many of the oldest project files were 
discarded.  Because FFP contracts have only been awarded in Afghanistan since the start 
of 2009, there was a smaller proportion of FFP data.     
 The questionnaire results were also non-ideal due to the small sample size and 
small population base from which to draw responses.  If a larger sample size could have 
been gathered, the chance of achieving significant results for the comparisons may have 
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improved.  In addition, the demographics from the survey had almost no representation of 
Quality Assurance/Quality Control, Site Superintendents, and Project Engineers.  The 
majority of responses came from Program/Project Managers, and Contract Management 
Personnel.  This might have influenced the kind of performance results and feedback 
provided on performance factors.   
 Several opportunities for future research are available to continue study on this 
topic.  Since FFP project performance data for Afghanistan was minimal at this stage, it 
may be beneficial to re-evaluate with an even larger pool of FFP and CPFF contracts in a 
few years from now.  Analysis over a longer time period could result in more statistically 
significant results.   
 Finally, CCASS data could be gathered for the already evaluated construction 
projects at any time to compare actual “soft” contract measures against “hard” project 
cost and time performance.  The result may be able to show correlations between quality 
measurements and perceived quality performance from the questionnaire.   
Conclusion 
 The findings of this research indicated there was no proven advantage in either 
contract type for cost performance.  FFP projects showed to control schedule growth 
significantly better than CPFF.   CPFF contracts indicated a better quality product.  The 
additional results of this study identified that understanding project performance in a 
contingency environment involves a balance of numerous variables.  Contract types 
influence more than just how a contract is managed.  Construction contracts impact the 
organizational structures required for government and contract personnel, relationships 
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and teamwork, risk impacts to internal and external influencing factors, and even the 
definition of project goals and success.           
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Appendix A: Organizational Structures 
AFCEE Structure 
 
 
Figure 6 - AFCEE Structure  (Mayo 2010) 
Figure 11 - AFCEE Structure shows the organizational structure for the whole of 
AFCEE.  Several support elements within this structure provide key aspects of the 
Contingency Construction Division effort.  The Acquisition and Contracting Support 
Division (AC), provides dedicated contracting services for AFCEE including CX.  The 
Operations Support Division (OS) houses the Financial Management (OSF) function for 
AFCEE.  They provide budgetary support to include formulation, justification and 
execution of financial documents, as well as other key budgetary and processing 
capabilities (Mayo 2010).   
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AFCEE/CX Structure 
 
 
Figure 7 - CX Division  (Mayo 2010) 
Figure 2 shows the CX Division organizational hierarchy.  The division chief and 
executive staff oversees the all aspects of their construction projects.  The 
MILCON/Minor Construction (CXM) element is responsible for installation and facility 
construction directly used by U.S. military in the AOR.  The Security Transition (CXT) 
element is charged with construction projects that improve Iraqi and Afghan government 
facilities and infrastructure.  The Support (CXS) element is responsible for the oversight 
and contracts for technical assistants, basic design and master planning service personnel 
(Title I), quality assurance oversight personnel (Title II), and Architectural-Engineering 
design services that make the AFCEE mission and model of construction run.  The 
Programs (CXP) element acts as an “owner’s agent for the Commander of the Air Force 
Forces (COMMAFFOR) for any large scale construction executed by USACE or the 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).  Finally, the Deployed (AFCEE-A 
or CXA) element performs as the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) and Project 
Manager in the AOR; a liaison between AFCEE-SA and the customer (Mayo 2010).   
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USACE District Structure 
 
 
Figure 8 - District Structure  (AED-N 2010) 
 
 Figure 13 - District Structure shows the organizational hierarchy for USACE 
districts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The district is a largely self-sufficient organism.  They 
have a fully functional contracting branch, with multiple contracting officers in place.  
Also, the district has a small engineering function, capable of providing some minimal 
design guidance and oversight.   The construction branch oversees the execution of 
construction projects; provide QA and COR support.  They contain a safety branch, 
capacity development, public affairs, and internal review functions.   
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Appendix B: Cost Plus Versus Firm Fixed Questionnaire 
 
The purpose of this survey is to determine the extent different performance factors influence the 
outcome of Firm Fixed Price(FFP) and Cost Plus Fixed Fee(CPFF) construction projects in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The outcome of this survey may contribute to decisions concerning future 
wartime contingency construction contracts. Please answer questions based on your 
experiences. 
Firm Fixed Price - "A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any 
adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract" (FAR 
16.202-1 ). 
Cost Plus Fixed Fee - "A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the 
contract. The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of 
changes in the work to be performed under the contract" (FAR 16.306). 
Instructions: Please rate the following influencing factors based on your past experience with 
Firm Fixed Price and Cost Plus Fixed Fee Projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. Give a relative 
weight to each factor based on how much each has impacted contract success the most. The 
focus of your response should be on how well you think each contract type was able to perform 
under a given circumstance and/or project stage. The survey is broken up into 4 short sections 
relating to the following topics: the overall performance of each contract type during each stage 
of project execution, the impact of specific internal factors, the impact of specific external 
factors, and your personal thoughts on each contract type. 
If at the end of any section you believe an important factor was not included or if you have any 
additional comments that need to be addressed, there will be opportunity to provide additional 
feedback at the end of the sections. 
Part 1: On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being least influential and 7 being most influential, rate how 
much cost, time and quality factors for each contract type are affected during each stage of the 
construction process. 
1. How influential is the execution of the Initial Planning and Estimating Stage on overall 
project success with respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low 
costs, and high quality are desired) 
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CPFF Time 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
2. How influential is the execution of the Design Stage on overall project success with 
respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high 
quality are desired) 
CPFF Time 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 
Most 
Influential 
3. How influential is the execution of the Construction Stage on overall project success 
with respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high 
quality are desired) 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
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CPFF Time 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
4. How influential is the execution of the Red Zone and Turnover Stage on overall project 
success with respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, 
and high quality are desired) 
CPFF Time 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
5. How influential is Contract Type on overall project success with respect to time, cost, 
and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high quality are desired) 
CPFF Time 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
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CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
6. How well do CPFF and FFP projects Perform Overall in terms of time, cost, and 
quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high quality are desired) 
Very Poor 2 3 4 5 6 Very Well 
CPFF Time 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
7. How well do projects meet the User's Design and Operational Expecations? (Does End 
State Use = User Intent?) 
Very Poor 2 3 4 5 6 Very Well 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
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\...tU::Sl I IU ::S 
FFP 
Comment 
/ 
11. How influential are Strategic Contract Acquisition and Management Decisions on the 
success of a contract? 
(Decisions would likely be made by Senior Military/Civilian Leaders and include: Project 
Prioritization, Site Selection, Payment Methods, Project Scope and Personnel 
Requirements.) 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 2 3 4 5 6 
Most 
Influential 
/ 
12. How influential are the Number and Availabilty of Trained Acquisition Personnel on 
the success of a contract? 
(Personnel would likely perform tasks such as: change order approvals, payment 
processing, etc.) 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
/ 
13. How influential are the Number and Availability of Trained Construction Oversight 
Personnel on the success of a contract? 
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(Personnel would likely perform tasks such as: submittal reviews, quality assurance, on-
site presence) 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
14. How influential are the Number and Availability of Trained Contracting Officer 
Representative Personnel on the success of a contract? 
(Personnel would likely perform tasks such as: submittal reviews, project management, 
quality assurance, on-site presence) 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
15. How influential is the Prime Contractor's Adequacy and Efficiency of Organization on 
the success of a contract? 
(Personnel would likely perform tasks such as: reachback support and highly-trained on-
site management and leadership) 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
Least 
Influential 
2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Influential 
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16. To what degree do Security Incidents from Internal Causes impact the success of a 
contract? 
(ie: poor security planning, incompetent workforce) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
17. To what degree do Internal Supply Issues impact the success of a contract? 
(ie: customer continually rejects part submittals) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
Most 
Most 
18. To what degree do Construction Accidents/Safety Violations impact the success of a 
contract? 
(ie: poor scaffolding, falls, improper PPE) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
19. To what degree are Warranty Calls the result of Internal Project Problems? 
(ie: the source of the problem is poor specifications, poor construction techniques, etc.) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
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Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
20. To what degree do Internal Factors (organizational persons and processes you can 
influence) affect the outcome of contracts? 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
CPFFTime 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFPTime 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
Part 3: On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being least affected and 7 being most affected, rate how 
much each External Factor affects overall project success for each contract type. 
External Factors are persons, places or things that are outside of your realm of influence. Such 
factors include: weather, terrorists, economic conditions, and other environmental factors 
outside of your organization's control. 
21. To what degree do External Supply Issues impact the success of a contract? 
(ie: backordered parts, supply route diverted) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Most 
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Comment 
22. To what degree does the Quality of the Construction Labor Workforce impact the 
success of a contract? 
(ie: Unskilled Labor/Sabotage/Absent) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
23. To what degree does the Quality of the Subcontractor Workforce impact the success 
of a contract? 
(ie: Unskilled Labor/Sabotage/Absent) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
24. To what degree do Security Incidents from External Causes impact the success of a 
contract? 
(ie: Terrorist activity) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
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25. To what degree do Unforeseen Site Conditions impact the success of a contract? 
(ie: UXOs, soil characteristics) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
26. To what degree does the Site Location impact the success of a contract? 
(ie: Remote, Access difficult, Few Laborers, High Traffic, etc.) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
27. To what degree do Local Political Pressures impact the success of a contract? 
(ie: extortion/land ownership disputes) 
Most 
Most 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
28. To what degree do Local Economic Factors impact the success of a contract? 
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(ie: inflation, high demand & few assets) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
/ 
29. To what degree are Warranty Calls the result of external causes? 
(ie: no regular maintenance, poor maintenance techniques, improper use of facility, etc.) 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Comment 
/ 
30. To what degree do External Factors (persons and processes outside of reasonable 
control) affect the outcome of contracts? 
Least 2 3 4 5 6 Most 
CPFFTime 
CPFF Cost 
CPFF Quality 
FFP Time 
FFP Cost 
FFP Quality 
Comment 
/ 
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31 . Other Factors (OPTIONAL: write-in any additional influencing factors that should be 
considered and rank their overall impact to construction success below) 
Least Impact 2 3 4 5 6 Most Impact 
Factor 1 - CPFF 
Factor 1 - FFP 
Factor 2 - CPFF 
Factor 2- FFP 
Factors 
Part 4: This section is an open comment section to provide your thoughts on successful 
contracts and important benefits and drawbacks of each contract type. Your feed back in this 
section is very important for drawing conclusions from th is study and developing possible 
solutions for future contract improvements. 
32. From your personal point of view, how do you define project success based on what 
you've experienced in Iraq and/or Afghanistan? 
33. From your personal point of view and experience, how do you think the government 
defines project success in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
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34. In your experience do you have a preference for one of the contracting methods 
used? What do you view as the primary benefit(s) of that execution avenue? 
/ 
35. Which contract method have you had greater success with? Why do you think that 
is? 
/ 
36. From the contractor perspective, which contract type would you prefer to work on? 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Neither 
Comment 
37. From the perspective of the government, which contract type saves the most money? 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Neither 
Comment 
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38. From the perspective of the government, which contract type delivers projects 
faster? 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Neither 
Comment 
J 
39. From the perspective of the government, which contract type delivers projects with 
the best quality? 
Cost Plus 
FFP 
Neither 
Comment 
Demographics 
40. What is your age? 
: ! 
41 . What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you 
have received? 
Less than high school degree 
High school degree or equivalent (e.g. , GED) 
Some college but no degree 
Associate degree 
Bachelor degree 
Graduate degree 
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42. How many years have you been in the construction industry? 
c=:D 
43. How many years have you done construction in Iraq and/or Afghanistan? 
44. What best describes your current occupational position? 
Quality Assurance or Quality Control 
Site Superintendent 
Construction or Project Manager 
Contract Officer or Representative 
Program Manager 
Project Engineer 
End User or Project Leadership 
Other (please specify) 
45. What other positions have you held in Iraq or Afghanistan? 
(Select all that apply) 
Quality Assurance or Quality Control 
Site Superintendent 
Construction or Project Manager 
Contract Officer or Representative 
Program Manager 
Project Engineer 
End User or Project Leadership 
Other (please specify) 
Done 
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P D
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utputs 
Table 21 - Sam
ple A
FC
E
E A
cquisition Tim
eline M
etric D
ata 
 
 
Task Mo TotaiiGE Initial SOR Adj SOR Date Date to Date RFP Date Proposal Date TE to Est. Award Award Date 
Orde d Date Contracting Issued Due Contracting Date 
r 
0012 0 $70,206,757.00 3/31 /2008 3/31/2008 6/12/2008 7/2/2008 7/11 /2008 9/19/2008 9/11/2008 
0013 0 $11,616,190.00 4/23/2008 4/23/2008 5/13/2008 8/20/2008 8/21/2008 9/15/2008 9/12/2008 
0011 0 $14,660,344.00 7/3/2009 3/22/2010 3/26/2010 4/16/2010 4/19/2010 6/9/2010 6/8/2010 
roo12 0 $22.1 96.00 5/4/2010 3/9/20 10 5/7/20 10 5/10/2010 5/31/2010 5/18/2010 
roo11 0 $14,660,344.00 8/20/2009 3/22/2010 3/26/2010 4/16/2010 4/19/2010 6/9/2010 6/8/2010 
0010 0 $15,096.405.00 4/1/2008 4/1/2008 5/5/2008 5/28/2008 6/11/2008 7/13/2008 7/2/2008 
roo12 0 $16,985,697.00 4/7/2008 4/7/2008 5/13/2008 6/3/2008 6/16/2008 7/18/2008 7/16/2008 
roo14 0 $22,961 ,889.00 3/24/2008 3/24/2008 6/4/2008 6/24/2008 7/1/2008 9/19/2008 8/29/2008 
roo17 0 $13,966,783.00 11/18/2008 1/12/2009 11/18/2008 2/9/2009 3/9/2009 3/31/2009 5/15/2009 5/13/2009 
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Table 22 - Sam
ple A
FC
E
E C
ost and Schedule G
row
th D
ata 
 
Contract# 1 TO !Title I Original TO I Current TO I $Growth I % Cost I Awarded 
..... 
.... 
FA8903-06-D-8505 2 MOl Crim inal Investigation I 4235350 4165598.3 -69751.75 -0.0164 3/8/07 7/10/07 4/30/08 
FA8903-06-D-8506 2 207th ANA Commando Kane 9706144 12643153 2937009 0.3025 9/24/09 11/23/10 4/28/11 
FA8903-06-D-8513 2 Construction Services in Su~ 29835528 32239172 2403644 0.0805 10/19/06 8/23/07 12/15/08 
FA8903-06-D-8505 3 National Command & Contr 1821915 2920893 1098978 0.6031 3/27/07 3/31/08 1/27/08 
FA8903-06-D-8506 3 Construction of FOB Kandak 14980754 14980754 0 0 9/28/09 3/29/10 12/30/10 
FA8903-06-D-8512 3 Construct Iraqi AF and Flighi 21280964 8580964 -12700000 -0.5967 6/15/07 2/10/08 2/10/08 
FA8903-06-D-8505 4 Construct & Renovate Sarna 6949432 6876692 -72740 -0.0104 9/27/07 5/28/08 2/17/08 
FA8903-06-D-8506 4 Repair Runway 18/36, Shine 34249622 38748119 4498497 0.1313 3/26/10 2/15/11 2/26/11 
FA8903-06-D-8509 4 Construction to Support the 6896935 6527165.1 -369769.9 -0.0536 4/24/07 9/30/07 5/31/08 
FA8903-06-D-8510 4 Facilites for 4th BDE of 9th [ 31804561 31761379 -43182.24 -0.0013 3/29/07 11/25/07 9/28/08 
FA8903-06-D-8521 4 Construct the Navy SEat Un 14988526 15163752 175226 0.0116 2/1/07 12/ 10/07 7/31/08 
FA8903-06-D-8504 5 Facilities for the 11th DIV H( 5038726 9922127 4883401 0.9691 12/29/06 6/30/07 7/23/07 
FA8903-06-D-8505 5 Vehicle Re pai r Facilities for I 10268243 402159.64 -9866083 -0.9608 9/30/07 9/26/08 2/15/08 
FA8903-06-D-8507 5 Kabul Military Training Cent' 37631248 40857595 3226347 0.0857 11/8/06 3/11/08 8/31/09 
FA8903-06-D-8510 5 Construct Faci lities for the 1 28831963 28776593 -55369.53 -0.0019 5/22/07 3/31/08 8/31/08 
FA8903-06-D-8507 6 Kabul Military Training Cent ' 19590497 28108433 8517936 0.4347 3/2/07 1/24/08 1/9/10 
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Table 23 - Sample AFCEE Cost and Schedule Growth Data Cont. 
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A
ppendix D
: Survey D
ata and A
nalysis 
Table 24 - Survey D
ata 
 
How influential is the execution of the Initial Planning and Estimating Stage 
on overall project success with respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming 
How influential is the execution of the Design Stage on overall project success with 
respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high 
quality are desired) short timeframes, low costs, and high quality are desired) 
CPFF Time CPFF Cost CPFF Quality FFP Time FFP Cost 
).186 
6 6 4 6 6 
3 4 2 7 6 
4 4 4 7 7 
6 6 5 7 7 
6 4 7 3 5 
7 5 5 7 5 
4 -- 4 --- 1 - 4 - 4 
3 6 6 6 5 
6 6 6 2 2 
7 5 3 7 6 
5 -- 7 --- 2 - 7 - 6 
7 4 2 7 6 
4 2 6 6 6 
6 6 6 4 4 
5 -- 3 --- 2 - 7 - 6 
6 6 5 7 6 
3 2 2 4 6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
FFP Quality 2CPFF Time 2CPFF Cost 2CPFF Quality 2FFP Time 2FFP Cost 2FFP Quality 
5 6 7 5 6 7 5 
5 3 4 2 7 6 5 
7 4 4 4 6 6 6 
5 4 6 7 4 6 7 
1 7 1 6 4 3 5 
5 7 7 5 7 7 5 
7 - 3 - 3 -- 1 -- 7 - 7 -- 1 
3 3 5 5 6 6 3 
4 6 6 6 2 2 3 
5 7 6 5 7 6 5 
2 - 5 - 7 -- 4 -- 7 - 6 -- 4 
2 6 4 2 7 6 2 
5 5 7 6 5 7 6 
4 6 6 6 4 4 4 
2 - 5 - 4 -- 1 -- 7 - 6 -- 1 
5 4 5 4 5 6 5 
5 3 4 4 5 7 7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
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r r 
How influential is the execution of the Construction Stage on overall project success 
with respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs. and 
How influential is the execution of the Red Zone and Turnover Stage on overall 
project success with respect to time, cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, 
low costs, and high quality are desired) 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
high quality are desired) 
3CPFF Time 3CPFF Cost 3CPFF Quality 3FFP Time 3FFP Cost 
6 7 7 6 7 
7 6 5 4 3 
4 4 4 7 7 
7 7 7 7 7 
7 4 5 3 6 
7 7 7 7 7 
6 6 7 6 6 
3 - 3 -- 4 - 6 - 6 
6 6 6 3 3 
7 5 5 7 4 
3 6 7 4 6 
5 6 3 7 7 
2 3 6 7 7 
6 6 6 5 5 
5 3 4 7 6 
6 6 6 6 6 
5 - 5 -- 5 - 7 - 7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
3FFP Quality 4CPFF Time 4CPFF Cost 4CPFF Quality 4FFP Time 4FFP Cost 4FFP Quality 
7 6 6 5 6 6 5 
2 6 7 5 4 3 2 
7 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
1 5 1 7 4 3 5 
7 5 5 4 5 5 4 
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 _ 3 _ 4 __ 5 _ 6 _ 6 -- 3 
4 6 6 6 3 3 4 
4 7 4 5 7 4 5 
7 3 6 7 4 6 7 
2 3 4 2 4 4 2 
5 6 4 5 7 3 5 
5 6 6 6 4 4 4 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 3 2 2 5 2 2 7 _ 6 _ 6 __ 6 _ 7 _ 7 -- 7 
7 
7 
7 - 7 -- 7 - 7 - 7 -- 7 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
5 5 7 5 5 7 
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How influential is Contract Type on overall project success with respect to time, 
cost, and quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high quality are How well do CPFF and FFP projects Perform Overall in terms of time, cost, and 
desired) quality? (Assuming short timeframes, low costs, and high quality are desired) 
5CPFF Time 5CPFF Cost 5CPFF Quality 5FFP Time 5FFP Cost 5FFP Quality 6CPFF Time 6CPFF Cost 6CPFF Quality 6FFP Time 6FFP Cost 6FFP Quality 
7 7 5 7 7 5 7 5 6 5 4 5 
1 2 5 6 7 3 2 1 5 6 7 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 7 7 7 7 
4 4 3 7 7 3 4 5 6 5 4 4 
7 5 3 4 6 1 7 4 6 6 3 6 
7 7 7 3 3 3 7 7 7 4 4 4 
7 7 6 1 1 1 5 5 7 3 3 1 
3 5 5 6 6 3 3 5 5 6 6 3 
5 5 5 5 3 4 4 6 6 3 3 4 
7 6 6 7 5 4 7 7 7 6 1 4 
2 - 6 -- 7 - 5 - 7 -- 2 -- 4 - 4 -- 6 - 4 - 5 -- 4 
3 -- 6 -- 2 - 7 - 7 -- 2 -- 3 -- 7 -- 5 - 6 - 4 -- 2 
2 - 1 -- 1 - 1 _ 1 __ 1 _ 1 _ 4 __ - 2 - 2 -- 4 
6 - 6 -- 6 - 4 - 4 -- 4 -- 6 - 6 -- 6 - 3 - 3 -- 3 
5 - 4 -- 3 - 7 _ 6 __ 2 _ 3 _ 5 __ 7 _ 4 _ 3 -- 1 
5 5 4 7 7 4 6 6 6 6 6 4 
5 4 5 7 7 7 4 5 6 6 7 6 
7 7 7 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 1 1 
5 5 7 6 5 5 5 5 7 6 6 4 
7 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 7 6 5 4 
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To what degree are To what 
Warranty Calls the result degree do To what degree does the 
of Internal Project External Quality of the 
Problems? (ie: the Supply Construction Labor 
source of the problem is Issues Workforce impact the 
poor specifications, poor impact the success of a contract? 
construction techniques, To what degree do Internal Factors (organizational persons and processes you can success of (ie: Unskilled 
etc.) influence) affect the outcome of contracts? a contract? Labor/Sabotage/Absent) 
19FFP 19Cost Plus 20CPFF Time 20CPFF Cost 20CPFF Quality 20FFP Time 20FFP Cost 20FFP Quality 21 FFP 21Cost Plus 22FFP 22Cost Plus 
5 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 3 5 5 
2 2 6 7 3 2 2 2 6 6 2 6 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 4 
4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 6 6 
r- 4 - 4 -- 7 -- 3 --- 5 -- 6 - 1 -- 4 - 4 - 4 - 3 - 3 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 6 6 
7 1 7 7 7 6 6 6 3 3 1 7 
r- 3 - 6 -- 6 -- 6 --- 6 -- 3 - 3 -- 3 - 3 - 6 - 3 - 6 6 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 6 6 7 7 
3 3 7 7 
2 4 5 6 7 6 7 5 7 5 7 7 
6 6 5 4 7 6 4 7 6 4 7 5 
2 2 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 
- -- -- --- -- - -- - - - -3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 6 6 5 
2 2 6 4 6 6 4 6 6 5 6 6 
6 6 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
2 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 
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r T T r r T 1 
To what degree does the To what degree do To what degree do To what degree does the To what degree do Local To what degree do Local 
Quality of the Security Incidents from Unforeseen Site Site Location impact the Political Pressures Economic Factors 
Subcontractor Workforce External Causes impact Conditions impact the success of a contract? impact the success of a impact the success of a 
impact the success of a the success of a success of a contract? (ie: Remote, Access contract? (ie: contract? (ie: inflation, 
contract? (ie: Unskilled contract? (ie: Terrorist (ie: UXOs, soil difficult, Few Laborers, extortion/land ownership high demand & few 
Labor/Sabotage/Absent) activitx) characteristi~ High Traffic, etc.) disput~ assets) 
23FFP 23Cost Plus 24FFP 24Cost Plus 25FFP 25Cost Plus 26FFP 26Cost Plus 27FFP 27Cost Plus 28FFP 28Cost Plus 
5 5 7 2 7 4 7 3 5 5 5 5 
6 6 3 1 4 2 4 5 3 3 1 1 
6 4 7 7 5 3 6 3 5 3 5 3 
6 6 3 3 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 4 
..--- 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 4 3 4 4 
6 6 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 
1 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
3 6 5 6 3 6 5 6 6 4 6 4 
7 7 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 6 6 
7 7 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
7 7 7 6 6 5 7 5 7 6 7 5 
6 4 5 3 3 1 7 6 4 2 3 2 
7 6 4 5 6 4 6 5 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 3 
6 5 3 2 3 2 3 2 5 5 3 3 
" 6 6 5 4 6 4 6 6 6 5 
- - - - - - - - - - -6 6 7 7 6 1 7 2 7 2 6 2 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
" 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 2 6 2 
7 7 6 6 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
112 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Other Factors (OPTIONAL: write-in any additional influencing factors that 
should be considered and rank their overall impact to construction 
success below) 
Factor 1 - Factor 1 - Factor 2 - Factor 2 -
CPFF FFP CPFF FFP Factors 
3 
7 
3 
6 
5 
4 
5 
6 
1 
3 
6 
6 
4 
7 
7 
5 
6 
4 
5 
FACTOR 1 -Staff retention and experience in Contingency Construction 
is critical to the success of the work. Under CPFF types, the staff is 
highly focused on delivering to the client requirements, whereas under 
FFP types, the staff is often challenged by conflicts and stress. CPFF 
forms support the long term development and retention of skilled and 
experienced staff familiar with client requirements and expectations 
making for a more predictable and successful program. FACTOR 2-
Ethics are a serious cha llenge in contingency contracting due to high 
levels of corruption within the host government and supply networks. 
CPFF properly aligns ethical expectations with client expectations. FFP 
provides high stress to make impacts go away through improper means, 
6 creating higher risk of ethical failures. 
I would suggest you only ue CPFF to perform construction successfully 
in a war zone such as Afghanistan 
1 1) Best value 2) Long term sustainability 
5 
Lack of awareness of operating theatre difficulties Same We do not 
seem to learn by experience but we seem to shred all information and 
6 start again next time around Same 
4 
Factor 1 - CPFF Team approach. We talk about it, but the team is 
typically in two camps and adversarial. You need checks and balances, 
but the ultimate goal is to produce a "good enough" product for the 
environment without compromising safety. This may have a reduced 
quality, but should provide more sustainable facilities. Additionally 
lessons learned from previous projects should be taken advantage of 
more, but normally different interpretations are made between projects 
for the same issue. Factor 1 FFP Team Approach. Similar to CPFF 
above, but a more concerted effort by the QA and the COR to keep the 
contractor honest with regards to shortcuts. However, QA and the COR 
should be willing to compromise on equal materials, field design 
changes or construction techniques that can provide the same quality, 
faster delivery and potential I a cost savings to the contractor or Afghan 
subcontractor. The fast pace at which the designs are developed may 
meet code requirements but are not always practical to build due to the 
window for constructability prior to submittal for approval is short. The 
QA has not incentive to get the project done faster and is sometimes 
motivated to extend the project by creating more paperwork taking 
contractor resources away from construction and documentation 
activities. 
1. Lack of trained Govt COR personnel with no clue of construction in a 
Contingency Env. and not trained in risk mgt associated with FFP vs 
Cost+ contracts. 2. Constant turnover of CORs. and their lack of 
7 construction experience 2. 
 
 
113  
32. From your personal point of view, how do you define project 
success based on what you've experienced in Iraq and/or Afghanistan? 
Open-Ended Response 
Delivery of constructed quality-appropriate facilities to mission requirements on a timely, cost-
effective, safe and ethically compliant basis in a manner that supports sustainable profitability for the 
contractor, safe and productive growth for the participants, healthy cultural and mentoring 
interactions with host nation resources and customer satisfaction. 
Project success is working with the government to jointly overcome obstacles to meeting or 
2 exceeding mission objectives 
3 
4 
5 
6 ON time, On budget, no serious incidents, and AFCEE client satisfaction. 
7 Overall client satisfaction 
8 The quality and time to finish the project on schedule. 
9 Site selection, planning, planning, planning 
A successful project is one built within budget and quality targets with minimal schedule delays that 
achieves the objective of the organization responsible for execution (CSTC-A or US FOR-A for 
10 example). 
A typical "canned" answer is on time, under budget and done with no accidents. I define success in 
this AOR by the following: 1) no accidents while imparting a safety culture to a work force with no 
previous safety history; 2) provide quality and sustainable facilities; 3) meet project budget; 4) help 
the local subcontractors be successful and make money. Good contractors in order to be successful! 
need to be profitable. Mentoring and helping them is key to leaving a sustainable construction 
industry. If you do these things you will have satisfied customers and end users. I left off schedule 
on purpose. Schedule is always important, but in this AOR I have only once achieved all three 
milestones (cost, schedule and quality). I focus on delivering quality facilities within cost. In a 
contingency environment with major security issues, unskilled workforce, unpredictable Host nation 
government and most materials being shipped in from out of country, meeting a prescribed FPOP in 
a RFP has had a low probability of being met. I would rather be late than provide facilities that are 
11 substandard and have legacy maintenance issues. 
12 a signed 1354 
13 Delivering a complet and usable project that is maintainable with local resources 
14 
It depends on project location in the country. On ISAF facilities- on or under budget, on or ahead of 
schedule, meeting or exceeding quality expectations Remote locations- completing the project on 
15 budget while meeting or exceeding quality expectations 
Providing a quality, durable product in a timely fashion. There will be multiple delays/extensions on 
most projects. If the delays can be minimized and the site turned over without impacting the end 
16 user, the project is successful. 
1. Completing the project on time and within budget= #1 success factor 2. Ability to sit down and 
talk through issues as a team, rather than the Govt always being suspicious that the HERC is trying 
to get something "over" on the COR. This is extremely frustrating. It seems tht all teaming and 
partnering has gone by the way side over the past 2 years. 3. Ability to get bona fide changes 
17 through the system. This process is broken and needs fixing. 
If the project is completed and meets all the requirements of a project the same as I would do in the 
18 US in the private sector them it is a success. I have done is repeatedly in Iraq 
19 
Completion of project with good quality in a reasonable period of time generally within budget with 
20 minimal accidents. 
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33. From your personal point of view and experience, how do you think 
the government defines project success in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
Open-Ended Response 
Predictable project delivery to customer mission requirements at the lowest cost. 
the government has gotten away from a team approach that served AFCEE so well in the past and 
2 now seek to blame contractors rather than work with them 
3 
4 
5 
6 same as 32 
7 Best value, minimizing costs associated with long term sustainability. 
8 The time to finish the project on schedule. 
Completion of build to operational readiness and it should be -the security forces need these facilties 
9 if we are to move forward as withour security none of the other nice NGO projects will succeed 
10 A project that meets budget, quality and schedule targets and as few changes as possible. 
11 Meet Schedule, Quality and Cost metrics. 
12 a signed 1354 
13 Project complete 
14 
It may sound harsh but I believe that many Government representatives simply define success as 
15 completion. 
Lowest cost at award appears to be the government's definition of success. It does not take into 
16 consideration the number of amount of delays or modifications. 
On time delivery and with the fewest change orders, whatever makes it easiset on the Govt COR 
17 personnel without having to deal with San Antonio. 
18 Bottom line is spend the money. and it=f they get what they asked for or near they are happy. 
19 
20 same as 32 
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34. In your experience do you have a preference for one of the 
contracting methods used? What do you view as the primary benefit(s) 
of that execution avenue? 
Open-Ended Response 
We pursue and execute both CPFF and FFP contract types, but strongly prefer CPFF contract forms. 
The CPFF form encourages greater participation in the clients mission, improved career 
development for staff and professional relationships, increased safety and quality, and reduced 
"unexpected event carnage" from security, site conditions and personality conflict conditions. 
Where the requirements can be clearly defined up front FFP protects the government interest the 
best as risk is placed on the contractor. On CPFF contractors use the system by bidding low to win 
2 the project and then in this contingency environment use the system to build back their cost back up 
3 
4 
Yes, from the Contractor perspective Cost Plus is prefered. The external risk factors do not need to 
5 have contingnency applied to the bid price in order to get internal approvals to bid the work. 
6 CPFF would be my suggestion as the only way to do work in a war zone. 
CPFF provides a better quality product and greater consideration of client needs and input. FFP 
contract tend to dive out the better companies as the in he rant risks are greater and there is no real 
7 reward (future oportunities) for exceptional services under the FFP model of contract awards. 
8 I prefer CCPP. The more time you work on the project, the more money you earn. 
9 Cost plus as so many outside influences can affect timescales and time is money 
I believe the government is best served with a CPFF approach. That gives the government the most 
control and does not require a contractor to add large contingencies. Under FFP contracting unused 
contingency accrues to the contractor. Under CPFF unused contingencies accrue to the government. 
The owner (government) almost always benefits from more control and the ability to manage 
10 contingency rather than have contractors manage contingency. 
For this AOR CPFF, provides the government with the greatest flexibility for changes, due to 
changing end user requirements and minimal costs for the changes. It also will have a greater 
chance of having a successful teaming arrangement between the COR, QA and the contractor. 
Since all will have a common goal to succeed.The government has the greater risk. Most contractors 
wi ll bid extremely low under CPFF and bet on change orders because the Government will not T for 
11 D a contractor because of the tight timeframes. 
cpff allows more flexibility , higher degree of compliance with desired end use, higher quality, safer 
12 work site 
13 
14 
Generally speaking, as an experienced Project Manager I personally prefer FFP contracts because 
they allow the opportunity to decrease cost thus increasing profit margin which results in reconition 
and advancement for those able to succeed on FFP. However, in a war zone the preference is CPFF 
15 because there are too many factors outside of the contractor's control. 
16 CPFF is by far the best contracting method for contingent environments. 
Cost Plus needed to be used for projects outside the wire, and the Security costs need to be T&M, 
17 not FFP elements 
CPFF allows the flexibility to change on the ru to existing conditions or unexpected conditions and 
still meet the mission. FFP is to rigid for this environment and creates a adversarial relationship 
18 between the govt and contractor 
19 
CPFF fits the operating environment better due to the number of unknowns in a post conflict 
20 situation. 
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35. Which contract method have you had greater success with? Why do 
you think that is? 
Open-Ended Response 
We have had much greater success with CPFF forms and believe they provide greater success for 
the customer; particularly when the customer provides sufficient trained and qualified oversight to 
provide timely and appropriate technical direction to deal with endemic challenges of changing 
security, supply and site conditions. 
FFP, design build, if it is used properly and not altered during the construction process by requiring 
unnecessary reviews and submittals. The burden is placed on the contractor to provide a complaint 
2 finished product. That is where the focus needs to be, not on the process. 
3 
4 
Cost Plus. With FFP, the project is a success if the cost of the identified risks is less than your 
contingency, but the likelihood of the risk and the cost impact if it happens are both outside of your 
5 control. 
6 Only CPFF has been performed 
CPFF has been the most successful! because it looks at more than just low cost. It is more likely to 
provide a better quality of contractor and realistic pricing for the services and goods requested. Best 
7 value is rarely achieced in FFP contacts. 
8 FFP .. . because it is faster and more challenging and pressure. 
9 Cost plus - Government willingness to engage and complete a project at a controlled cost 
10 We have had success with both, but the government has paid us less on a CPFF versus FFP. 
CPFF has been more successful, because every project requirements have changed even when the 
scope maybe well defined. The end user will have changes between when the project was 
programmed and when it is awarded or the end user will rotate out. CPFF lends itself to adjust to 
these scenarios quicker by having a more ambigous scope to allow it. Be doing this the end user 
gets the facilities they need to adapt to the mission changes rather than facilities they don't need that 
11 were programmed many months ago. 
12 if success is defined as profit, then ffp if success is defined as beter end product, then cpff 
13 
14 
15 I have had equal success with both and a few failures with both 
We have been very successful with CPFF by meeting the contractural FPOPs and returning funding 
16 that was not required. 
17 We've had success with both types. No difference 
18 CPFF as stated above 
19 
CPFF contractors can achieve better quality and work deliberately without the fear of loss due to 
20 conditions beyond their control 
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36. From the contractor perspective, which contract type would you prefer to work on? 
Response Comment 
1 Cost Plus 
2 Cost Plus 
3 
4 Cost Plus 
5 Cost Plus 
6 Cost Plus 
7 Cost Plus 
8 Cost Plus 
9 Cost Plus 
10 Cost Plus 
11 Cost Plus 
12 Cost Plus 
13 FFP 
14 Cost Plus 
15 Cost Plus 
16 Cost Plus 
17 Neither 
18 Cost Plus 
19 Cost Plus 
20 Cost Plus 
risk is on government, higher margins are possible 
Naturally there is less risk, but we tend to make more on FFP. 
Cost Plus in this environment when awarded based on realistic expectations 
will deliver a quality product and can adjust to the needs of the end user with 
minimal cost impacts if done in a timely fashion. 
In a war zone I would prefer to work on CPFF. Outside of a war zone I would 
prefer FFP 
No difference 
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37. From the perspective of the government, which contract type saves the most money? 
Response Comment 
Neither 
2 FFP 
3 
4 Cost Plus 
5 Cost Plus 
6 Cost Plus 
7 Cost Plus 
8 FFP 
9 Cost Plus 
10 Cost Plus 
11 Cost Plus 
12 FFP 
13 FFP 
14 Cost Plus 
15 Cost Plus 
16 Cost Plus 
17 FFP 
18 FFP 
19 Cost Plus 
20 Cost Plus 
This answer depends on type of project. CPFF is clearly lower cost for 
emerging areas, less defined scopes and conditions, and evolving mission 
requirements. FFP is lower cost for clean supply and deliver contracts with well 
defined scopes and conditions. Emerging scopes and conditions is typical of 
construction in contingency environments , whereas predictable scope and 
conditions is more typical in contingency material delivery. 
The AFCEE Iraq program which was Cost Plus has cost overruns in the 1 OO's 
of millions 
No always in the initial but certainly in the long term costs. 
On FFP costs can run high with change orders that the client has not been 
able to forsee the Cost Plus is more of a partnership arrangementr 
Because changes occur on every project, Cost Plus allows the government to 
make changes without being impacted as much by change orders under FFP 
or if scope is deleted. But it has to be managed with decisions being made 
quickly rather than paying for a contractor to sit on site while decisions are 
being made. Conversly under FFP, the contractor will move forward until the 
Government issues a stop work and it could cost more for the stoppage and to 
pay for work in place that may no longer be needed. 
This would of course be contingent on the Government selecting good 
contractors 
For our projects, CPFF is very cost effective for the government. 
they think it does but in the long term it costs more in claims and rework 
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38. From the perspective of the government, which contract type delivers projects faster? 
Response Comment 
1 Cost Plus 
2 FFP 
3 
4 FFP 
5 FFP 
6 Cost Plus 
7 Neither 
8 FFP 
9 Cost Plus 
10 Cost Plus 
11 FFP 
12 Neither 
13 FFP 
14 Cost Plus 
15 Neither 
16 Neither 
17 FFP 
18 Neither 
19 Cost Plus 
20 Cost Plus 
This answer depends on type of project. CPFF is clearly faster for emerging 
areas, less defined scopes and conditions, and evolving mission requirements. 
FFP is faster for clean supply and deliver contracts with well defined scopes 
and conditions. 
There is no incentive on Cost plus to deliver faster FFP has LOs 
To complete a project of acceptable quality takes a set amount of time. The 
duration of time it takes to complete a project can only be reduced by incresing 
the cost or accepting and lower quality. 
Overall Cost plus 
Due to the LOs and to improve project margins, the motivation for the 
contractor is to get done as quickly as possibly to minimize general condition 
costs and to avoid LOs. 
I don't believe that either has a greater impact than another. 
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39. From the perspective of the government, which contract type delivers projects with the 
best quality? 
Response Comment 
1 Neither 
2 Cost Plus Because government assumes risk and pays for quality shortfalls 
3 
4 Cost Plus 
5 Neither 
6 Cost Plus 
7 Cost Plus 
8 Cost Plus 
9 Cost Plus 
10 Cost Plus 
11 Cost Plus 
12 Cost Plus 
13 Neither 
14 Cost Plus 
15 Cost Plus 
16 Cost Plus 
17 Neither 
18 Neither 
19 Cost Plus 
20 Cost Plus 
FFP contract drive away the quality qualified contractors and encourages the 
lesser experienced ones to aggressively persue work base soley on the lowest 
cost. 
Both parties are sticking with it to complete quality project 
FFP has a tendency to provide the bare minimum to maximize the projects 
Both about the same in Afghanistan 
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Table 25 - D
em
ographics D
ata 
 
Demographics Questions 
Question 
What is your age? 
How many years have you been 
in the construction industry? 
How many years have you done 
construction in Iraq and/or 
Afghanistan? 
What is the highest level of 
school you have completed or 
the highest degree you have 
received? 
What best describes your 
current occupational position? 
What other positions have you 
held in Iraq or Afghanistan? 
(Select all that apply) 
Mean 
51 
23.45 
5. 17 
Some College 
Contract 
Standard 
Deviation 
8.96 
8.53 
1.72 
Bachelor 
Degree 
12 
Of}icer or Program 
Representative Manager 
10 
9 
Graduate 
Degree 
7 
Construction or Quality End User or 
Project 
Manager 
6 
9 
Assurance or Site Project Project 
Quality Control Superintendent Engineer Leadership 
3 3 
Other (Sp ecifY) 
2 (Senior Executive) 
1 (Country Manager) 
1 (Government COR) 
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